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American innovation policy as expressed through intellectual property law contains a
curious gap: it encourages individual research investments, but does little to facilitate
cooperation among inventors, which is often a necessary precondition for innovation. This
Article provides an in-depth analysis of a policy problem that relates to this gap:
increasingly, public and private innovation investments depend upon the willingness of
private firms and institutions to cooperatively pool industrial, commercial, and scientific
data. Data holders often have powerful disincentives to cooperate with one another,
however. As a result, important research that the federal government has sought to
encourage through intellectual property policy and through other targeted investments is
being held back.
This Article addresses this issue by offering three contributions-one theoretical, one
empirical, and one prescriptive. The theoretical contribution builds upon legal, economic,
and public choice literature to explain why pooling data is relevant to innovation policy
and why the level of data sharing in some settings may be suboptimal. This discussion
offers a conceptual framework for scholars and policymakers to examine how data-pooling
relates to innovation policy goals.
This leads to the second contribution: an ethnographic study of private efforts to pool
data in an important field of research. This Article focuses on the field of cancer treatment
because it is one of the most active areas where efforts to pool data have recently coalesced.
Interviews with lawyers, executives, and scientists working at the vanguard of "Big Data"
projects in the field of cancer treatment offer a detailed view of how, precisely, data-
pooling problems can hinder technological progress. The study's most significant finding
is that impediments to the pooling of patient treatment and clinical trial data are diverse,
nuanced, and not reducible to collective action problems that are already well understood
by legal scholars and economists, such as the free-rider dilemma.
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These findings lead to the third key contribution: a set of targeted policy suggestions
designed to facilitate data pooling through regulatory action, amendments to federal
healthcare legislation, and tax incentives. These prescriptive measures are tailored to
address the sharing of health-related data, but they capture an approach that could be
applied in other settings where technological progress depends upon data-pooling.
Ultimately, this Article argues for a vision of innovation policy in which cooperative
exchanges of data are recognized as important preconditions for innovation that may
require government support.
20171 THE DATA-POOLING PROBLEM 181
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. IN T R O D U C T IO N ............................................................................................. 181
II. A BIG DATA AN TICOM M ON S? ................................................................. 189
A. INFORMATION EXCHANGE AND INNOVATION POLICY .................... 190
B. THE DATA-POOLING QUESTION ........................................................... 194
III. A STUDY OF RECENT DATA-POOLING EFFORTS IN
CAN CE R RE SEA R CH ..................................................................................... 205
A . STUDY M ETHODOLOGY ........................................................................... 205
B. COM PETITiVE CONCERN S ........................................................................ 208
C. COSTS OF OBTAINING AND PREPARING DATA FOR
P O O LIN G ..................................................................................................... 2 14
D . U N CERTAIN RETURN S .............................................................................. 219
IV. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .............................................. 222
A. IMPLICATIONS FOR INNOVATION POLICY ............................................ 222
B. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................. 227
V . C O N C L U SIO N ................................................................................................... 235
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article explores a policy problem at the intersection of federal
innovation policy1 and "Big Data.",2 The problem's outlines are starkly
simple: the U.S. government seeks to promote innovation primarily by
1. Legal scholars and economists commonly use the term "innovation policy" to
refer to policy interventions designed to bring about technological advances. See, e.g., Brett
M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257 n.26 (2007)
(discussing the role of pecuniary spillovers in innovation policy); Adam B. Jaffe, Josh
Lerner & Scott Stem, Introduction, in I INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY (2000)
(describing innovation policy as encompassing "longstanding issues, such as the
appropriate level and form of public support of research, as well as ... intellectual property
and the appropriate antitrust treatment of... industries where technology standards play a
key role."); Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 675 (2002) (discussing
the role of the patent system in innovation policy). See generally NICHOLAS S. VONORTAS
ET AL., INNOVATION POLICY: A PRACTICAL INTRODUCTION (Nicholas S. Vonortas, Phoebe
C. Rouge & Anwar Aridi eds., 2014).
2. "Big Data" describes the practice of drawing new and valuable insights from large
datasets that typically hold little independent value. See generally ViKTOR MAYER-
SCHONBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT WILL TRANSFORM
How WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 1-18 (2013) (discussing the Big Data phenomenon
generally).
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encouraging individual research investments, but cooperation among
information holders is an important precondition for innovation in many
settings. 3 An increasingly important form of such cooperation is the
aggregation (i.e., pooling) of data held by firms, institutions, and
individuals. This Article examines the forces that discourage data pooling
in an important field of research-oncology treatment-and considers how
the federal government might intervene to better promote innovation.
Scholars have long recognized that innovation can blossom from
combinations of technological information, such as industrial knowledge
and descriptions of inventions. In the 1980s, the economists Richard Nelson
and Sidney Winter wrote, "[I]nnovation in the economic system-and
indeed the creation or any sort of novelty in art, science, or practical life-
consists to a substantial extent of a recombination of conceptual and
physical materials that were previously in existence."4 Nearly sixty years
earlier, Joseph Schumpeter described the same idea when he defined
innovation as the discovery of new relationships between previously
combined conceptual components.5  Today, scholars of industrial
organization call this form of technological advancement, "recombinant
innovation."6
Recently, it seems that a new kind of recombinant innovation has drawn
widespread attention: Big Data. Rather than drawing upon combinations of
technological information, Big Data draws upon combinations of factual
information. Credit card receipts, Internet search histories, and patient
3. For a fascinating analysis of the importance of health insurers in creating new
information that is valuable to research and innovation, see Rebecca S. Eisenberg & W.
Nicholson Price II, Promoting Healthcare Innovation on the Demand Side (U. of Mich.
Law, Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series No. 503, 2016),
http://ssrn.com/abstract--2766707. This intersectional or combinational type of innovation
is distinct from "cumulative innovation" which scholars often describe through reference
to Isaac Newton's "shoulders of giants" trope. See infra Section I.A; see also Oren Bar-
Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Value of Giving Away Secrets, 89 VA. L. REV. 1857,
1858 (2003) ("Cumulative innovation characterizes most industrial sectors."); Suzanne
Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law,
5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 37 (1991) ("Most innovators stand on the shoulders of giants, and
never more so than in the current evolution of high technologies, where almost all technical
progress builds on a foundation provided by earlier innovators.").
4. RICHARD R. NELSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF
ECONOMIC CHANGE 130 (1982).
5. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, BuSINESS CYCLES: A THEORETICAL, HISTORICAL,
AND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CAPITALIST PROCESS (1939).
6. ANDREW HARGADON, How BREAKTHROUGHS HAPPEN: THE SURPRISING TRUTH
ABOUT How COMPANIES INNOVATE 31-52 (2003) (terming this characteristic
"recombinant innovation").
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treatment records from hospitals are standard examples of information that,
in earlier times, was treated as digital detritus. Recently, however, computer
scientists, statisticians, and engineers who specialize in data science have
developed useful algorithms with the help of vast sets of such data.7
The value of Big Data algorithms lies in their predictive power. Just as
weather forecasting techniques can determine the likelihood of a storm, Big
Data algorithms may soon be able to predict the likelihood that a crime will
occur on a particular street comer, the odds that a consumer will purchase a
product after seeing an online advertisement, or whether a cancer patient
will respond well to a particular treatment. 8 Importantly, experts believe that
the most valuable applications of Big Data-"the real deal," as one expert
interviewed for this Article called it-will be drawn from sets of data from
different sources. 9 As one technology commentator recently put it, "when
7. See, e.g., IAN AYRES, SUPER CRUNCHERS 88-111 (2007) (discussing the how the
aggregation of patient records combined with analytics could improve healthcare);
STEPHEN BAKER, THE NUMERATI 98-99 (2008) (describing the usefulness of gathering
large amounts of data for analysis); MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 2
(describing Big Data and its implications for science, industry, and society); ERIC SIEGEL,
PREDICTIVE ANALYTICs: THE POWER TO PREDICT WHO WILL CLICK, Buy, LIE, OR DIE 203
(2013) (exploring Big Data's impact on society); PATRICK TUCKER, THE NAKED FUTURE:
WHAT HAPPENS IN A WORLD THAT ANTICIPATES YOUR EVERY MOVE? 183-202 (2014)
(discussing the use of data analytics to predict crime); BIG DATA is NOT A MONOLITH
(Cassidy R. Sugimoto, Hamid R. Ekbia & Michael Mattioli eds.) (2016) (presenting a
multifaceted picture of Big Data, including discussions about its impact on different
academic disciplines and industrial domains).
8. See supra note 7; see also Jessica M. Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism Risk for
Sentencing, 67 EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2017), https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract id=2821136 (discussing predictive data-based tools used in connection with
criminal sentencing).
9. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 7,444,655 (listing Microsoft as assignee on
"Anonymous Aggregated Data Collection"). See generally MAYER-SCHONBERGER &
CUKIER, supra note 2; Christine Borgman, The Conundrum of Sharing Research Data, 63
J. AM. SoC'Y FOR INFO. SCI. & TECH. 1059 (2012) (discussing the importance of data
aggregation). For reasons explained in Part II, the ethnographic study at the heart of this
Article focuses on efforts to pool cancer research data. A useful example of the power of
aggregating and analyzing large sets of data in a different domain is "Google Photos," a
service offered by Google Inc. By pooling and analyzing image data contained in
photographs contributed by many users, Google engineers have developed algorithms that
can recognize objects in photographs with unprecedented accuracy. See Joshua A.T.
Fairfield, Mixed Reality: How the Laws of Virtual Worlds Govern Everyday Life, 27
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 55, 97 (2012) (describing Google's "particularly aggressive" photo
scraping and recognition capability).
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we recombine ... multiple datasets together, that sum ... is worth more
than its individual ingredients." 10
Experts in this new field believe the best way to aggregate data for this
purpose is through cooperative licensing-i.e., pooling. In simple terms, a
central administrator collects data from multiple data holders, analyses the
data, and then delivers helpful insights back to the contributors and possibly
licenses the data to third-parties. 11 There is an intuitive appeal to this model:
patent holders have long pooled related inventions to facilitate the
production and development of new technologies.12 This mode of
cooperation has been helpful to patent licensors and licensees alike by
dramatically reducing transaction costs, which are thought to be a chief
impediment to patent licensing in settings where ownership of related
patents is highly dispersed. 13 Without explicitly referring to patent pools,
experts in some industries and fields of research have recently attempted to
organize institutions similarly structured around the goal of collective data
licensing. 14
Any apparent similarities between pooling patents and pooling data
might be superficial, however. For one thing, contributing data to a pool can
entail steep up-front costs. It is costly to record, organize, and store vast
amounts of data on an ongoing basis.15 It is even costlier to ensure that data
is accurate, that it is disclosed in a manner that comports with various laws
and regulations (pertaining to privacy, for instance), that its provenance and
10. MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 2, at 108; see also Borgman, supra
note 9, at 1070 ("Indeed, the greatest advantages of data sharing may be in the combination
of data from multiple sources, compared or 'mashed up' in innovative ways.").
11. The process is highly analogous to patent pools for standards-essential patents-
patents which are required to implement an industry standard-where groups of patent
holders pool patents under the supervision of a third party administrator. Kassandra
Maldonado, Breaching RAND and Reaching for Reasonable: Microsoft v. Motorola and
Standard-Essential Patent Litigation, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 419, 446 (2014).
12. Id. (describing effective use of patent pools to facilitate licensing standard
essential patents).
13. Patent pools are federations of patent holders that reduce transaction costs by
collectively licensing complementary patent rights under unified agreements. For a deep
historical view of patent pooling, see Michael Mattioli, Power and Governance in Patent
Pools, 27 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 421 (2014); FLOYD L. VAUGHAN, THE UNITED STATES
PATENT SYSTEM (1956); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF
CAPITALISM 20-22 (1985); Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual
Property Rights & Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1293, 1393 (1996).
14. See, e.g., infra Part III (presenting the results of an ethnographic study of oncology
data pools).
15. Priscilla M. Regan, Federal Security Breach Notifications: Politics and
Approaches, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1103, 1108 (2009).
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pedigree are adequately documented and disclosed, and so forth. 16 Patent
holders also incur upfront costs, of course, in the form of research and patent
prosecution expenses. From an ex ante perspective, however, the value of
developing a patentable invention does not typically hinge upon eventual
membership in a patent pool; rather, it turns on the underlying value of the
invention itself. In contrast, as this Article explains, some types of data are
useful only when aggregated. As a result, if a thriving pool does not already
exist at the time the data is generated, weak incentives may exist for the
relevant data holder to maintain the data and prepare it for pooling. The
work of Nobelists in economics and political theory also suggests that data
holders will be reluctant to pool their data due to the risk of free riders-
i.e., third parties who obtain and benefit from the data without compensating
the data holders.17 Put simply, there are some compelling reasons to expect
that efforts to pool useful data will flounder due to widespread "social
dilemmas." 8
Anecdotal evidence, while limited, supports these doubts. Christine
Borgman, a leading computer science commentator, recently wrote that
"[t]he 'dirty little secret' behind the promotion of data sharing is that not
much sharing may be taking place." 19 Recent journalistic accounts of Big
Data often explain the potential benefits of data pooling, but rarely cite
examples of such cooperation in practice. 2 Instead, most real-world
16. See, e.g., Michael Mattioli, Disclosing Big Data, 99 MINN. LAW REV. 525 (2014).
The costs of sharing cancer research data are specifically outlined infra in Section III.C.;
see also Part II, infra (discussing HIPAA).
17. This concern stems from a vast body of scholarship, both theoretical and
empirical, concerning information generation and sharing. See, e.g., Joel Mokyr, The
Commons of Knowledge: A Historical Perspective, 4 ANN. PROC. WEALTH & WELL-BEING
NATIONS 29 (2012), https://www.beloit.edu/upton/assets/4 MOKYRpages29 44.pdf.
Leading intellectual property scholars addressed this concern in reference to scientific
research data in the 1990s. See infra notes 119, 121 and accompanying text (discussing the
work of Pamela Samuelson, J.H. Reichman, and Paul Uhlir). Under U.S. law, license
agreements and trade secrets law offer data holders potential recourse against parties who
directly misappropriate data. Data holders also can attempt to prevent data
misappropriation through physical or electronic barriers, such as encryption. See infra
Section II.A.
18. See, e.g., KENNETH J. ARROw, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 59
(1951) (discussing the defects of voting procedures); Robyn M. Dawes & David M.
Messick, Social Dilemmas, 35 INT'L J. PSYCHOL. 111, 111 (2000) (defining social choice
problems or social dilemmas as "situations in which each member of a group has a clear
and unambiguous incentive to make a choice that-when made by all members-provides
poorer outcomes for all than they would have received if none had made the choice.").
19. Borgman, supra note 9, at 1060 (identifying problems and limitations).
20. See, e.g., James Glantz, Is Big Data an Economic Dud?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/18/sunday-review/is-big-data-an-economic-big-
2017]
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examples of Big Data involve large, vertically integrated corporations
looking inward and drawing insights from the data they already hold.
21
Highly publicized reports of a recent failed effort to pool health data in the
United Kingdom seem to lend credence to these doubts.
22
If these concerns are empirically supported, policymakers should be
concerned.23 The federal government has invested heavily in the future
development of Big Data. In March 2012, the White House announced a
federal initiative under which six agencies committed over $200 million in
funds to advance the development of "tools and techniques needed to
access, organize, and glean discoveries from huge volumes of data.",24 In a
press release, the White House likened this initiative to earlier federal
efforts that led to "advances in supercomputing and the creation of the
dud.html (discussing an emerging view held by economists that Big Data is not living up
to its promise); Gary Marcus & Ernest Davis, Eight (No, Nine!) Problems with Big Data,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2014 (exploring the limitations of Big Data and advocating a more
tempered view of the phenomenon); Barnard Marr, Where Big Data Projects Fail, FORBES
(Mar. 17, 2015, 12:28 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/20 15/03/17/where-
big-data-projects-fail/ (arguing that many Big Data projects will ultimately fail to deliver);
MATHIEU COLAS ET AL., CAPGEMINI CONSULTING, CRACKING THE DATA CONUNDRUM:
How SUCCESSFUL COMPANIES MAKE BIG DATA OPERATIONAL (2014),
https://www.capgemini-consulting.com/resource-file-access/resource/pdf/big-datapov
_03-02-15.pdf (reporting the results of a survey of 226 executives across several
industries-e.g., retail, financial services, energy and utilities, and pharmaceuticals-in
which only 27% of the organizations described their Big Data investments as "successful"
and only 8% reported them as "very successful").
21. Authors frequently cite Target's analysis of its own customer records to predict
when a customer's purchasing habits indicate they may be pregnant, Google's use of its
own search records to predict the needs and wants of users, and Nefflix's "mining" of its
customers' viewing habits to make film recommendations and to develop its own
programming. See, e.g., David Carr, Giving Viewers What They Want, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
24, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/25/business/media/for-house-of-cards-using-
big-data-to-guarantee-its-popularity.html; Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your
Secrets, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Feb. 16, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/
magazine/shopping-habits.html; GOOGLE, Flu Trends: How Does This Work,
https://www.google.org/flutrends/about/ (last visited Aug. 12, 2017).
22. See, e.g., infra notes 117-18 and accompanying text (discussing the failed UK
National Health Service's National Programme for IT).
23. As explained in Part II, this problem can be understood as one of underuse caused
by a proliferation of exclusionary rights-i.e., a "tragedy of the anticommons." The term
is typically used in reference to patent rights, but here the term is adopted to describe the
possibly similar phenomenon with respect to data. See, e.g., David E. Adelman, A Fallacy
of the Commons in Biotech Patent Policy, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 985, 993 (2005)
(describing the "anticommons" theory).
24. Press Release, White House, Obama Administration Unveils "Big Data"





Internet., 25 The White House later commended dozens of early-stage data-
sharing ventures that "answered the President's call" for cooperative
partnerships designed to accelerate the development of Big Data. (Two of
these initiatives are subjects of the study in Part III of this Article.) 26 In early
2016, President Obama tasked Vice President Joe Biden to head "The
Cancer Moonshot"-a federal initiative to promote the development of
cancer cures, in part, by providing an infrastructure for sharing genomic
information. 27 If data held by non-public actors such as private hospitals,
corporations, and individuals is not widely pooled, however, then the
effectiveness of the government's targeted investments in this area may be
limited.
Hindrances to private data pooling could also undermine the federal
government's broader goals of promoting technological progress. A
primary goal of the patent system, for instance, is to encourage research
investments in a multitude of technological fields-including those fields
where Big Data may be poised to spur innovation, such as oncology
treatment.28 Because recent Supreme Court jurisprudence has called the
patentability of some kinds of algorithms into question, some types of Big
Data algorithms may not be patentable.29 Nevertheless, a data pool could
open the door to an algorithm, which in turn could open many more doors
to related patentable inventions regardless of the original algorithm's
patentability. 30 In short, there is widespread agreement among experts in
25. Id.
26. Press Release, Executive Office of the President, "Data to Knowledge to Action"
Event Highlights Innovative Collaborations to Benefit Americans (Nov. 12, 2013),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/Data2Action%2 0
Press%20Release.pdf.
27. Laurie McGinley, Biden to Tackle Broad Range of Cancer Issues, Including Drug
Prices, After Leaving White House, WASH. POST (Jan. 4, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-your-health/wp/2017/01/04/biden-to-tackle-
cancer-drug-prices-as-part-of-post-white-house-moonshot-work/; Genomic Data
Commons Data Portal, NAT'L CANCER INST., https://portal.gdc.cancer.gov/ (last visited
Aug. 12, 2017).
28. For an important related discussion of the intersection of patent law and data, see
Brenda M. Simon & Ted Sichelman, Data-Generating Patents, 111 Nw. U. L. REv. 377
(2017).
29. See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014) (indicating
that a software method may not be patentable if it covers only an abstract idea, and if there
is no additional "inventive concept" that applies to the underlying abstraction); see also
Robert Merges, Symposium: Go Ask Alice - What Can You Patent After Alice v. CLS
Bank?, SCOTUSBLOG (June 20, 2014), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/symposium-
go-ask-alice-what-can-you-patent-after-alice-v-cls-bank/ (discussing the implications of
the Alice case on patentability).
30. See infra Part IV.
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many fields that data pooling is an important precondition for technological
progress. The pooling of data is, as a result, relevant to policies that seek to
promote innovation.3
1
After explaining the policy relevance of data pooling in greater detail,
this Article drills down to explore how it is affecting just one field of
research: cancer treatment. This field was selected because it is one of the
most active areas where efforts to pool data have recently coalesced.32
Interviews with lawyers, executives, and scientists working at the vanguard
of Big Data projects in the field of oncology offer a detailed view of how
precisely data-pooling problems can hinder technological progress.
The interviews conducted for this study reveal that, contrary to
conventional wisdom, the data-pooling problem as it affects cancer
treatment is not reducible to either a free-ider dilemma or privacy
concerns. Rather, the impediments are contextual: concerns over
professional, competitive, and reputational standing, for instance, are
powerfully discouraging the pooling of cancer treatment and research data.
According to subjects interviewed, hospitals and other healthcare providers
are reluctant to share data that might reflect poorly on the quality of service
they provide; pharmaceutical companies, meanwhile, wish to closely guard
data that could reduce the value of existing or future intellectual property,
including patents and trade secrets; many academic researchers are loath to
share data that could fuel publications; individual patients, meanwhile, may
feel hesitant to share data that could expose them to various forms of
discrimination.33
Drawing upon these findings and others, this Article considers whether
the government should seek to promote technological progress by
encouraging data pooling. The Article then presents a menu of possible
interventions that address some of the impediments uncovered by the study.
These suggestions are specific to the field of cancer treatment and research,
31. Relatedly, the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 aims to "incentivize future
innovation." S. REP. No. 114-220, at 3 (2016), https://www.congress.gov/congressional-
report/ l14th-congress/senate-report/220/1. Trade secret law offers a less compelling
example of government policy that would be undermined by data-sharing problems,
however: this is because trade secrecy may discourage the disclosure of data collection
preparation methods, which is necessary for the useful exchange of data. I explored this
topic in an earlier article. See Mattioli, supra note 13.
32. See supra notes 24-28.
33. A topic outside the scope of this study is whether and how technological norms
and infrastructures impede data sharing. Such norms may include, for instance, mandatory
registration or "login" procedures that offer little to no value to data holders and that, in
the aggregate, impose high transaction costs on innovative data aggregation. Telephone
Interview with Anonymous Subjects #7 and #8, Nat'l Insts. of Health (NIH) (Oct. 21,
2014).
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but they capture a methodology that could be helpful in other settings as
well. A broad goal of this Article is to encourage similar studies of data
pooling in other industries and research settings.
Part II of this Article explains how the aggregation of information
(including data) relates to federal innovation policy. This background
discussion helps situate the Big Data phenomenon within a policy
framework and explains the theoretical basis for expecting pooling efforts
to run up against collective action problems. Part Ill presents an original
ethnographic study of data pooling in the field of cancer research. As briefly
noted above, discussions with individuals involved in several data pooling
projects reveal that some of the most significant problems data pools face
are more complex and nuanced than theory predicts. Part IV considers the
appropriateness of a policy response to the problems uncovered by the
study. The discussion then offers a set of policy proposals designed to
address some of the impediments to pooling uncovered by the study. There
is no "one-size-fits-all" solution, however. This closing discussion argues
for a view of innovation policy in which cooperative data pooling is
regarded as an important precondition for innovation that may sometimes
require government intervention. Part V concludes.
II. A BIG DATA ANTICOMMONS?
Big Data is a promising new platform for innovation that often requires,
as a prerequisite, the aggregation of data held by different firms, institutions,
and individuals. There is reason to doubt that such aggregation will occur
frequently or broadly enough to be meaningful, however, without support
from the government. 34 Scholars from the fields of law, economics, public
choice, and other disciplines have theorized that information of many kinds
(including data) is ill-suited to widespread exchange. 35 The chief problems,
these theorists believe, are that valuable information is often costly to
prepare for exchange and highly subject to free-riding, as well as being
risky to share when doing so might run afoul of privacy laws.3 6 Anecdotal
accounts from the front lines of Big Data seem to support this prediction.37
Because barriers to data pooling stand to undermine federal innovation
policy goals, policymakers should be concerned, and should explore
potential corrective steps.
34. See infra Section I.B. (discussing barriers to naturally emerging data pools).
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A. INFORMATION EXCHANGE AND INNOVATION POLICY
Combinations of technological information, such as industrial
knowledge and descriptions of inventions, can fuel innovation.38 Joseph
Schumpeter described this phenomenon when he wrote that technological
innovation involves "combin[ing] factors in a new way," or through
"carrying out new combinations" of ideas. 39 The economic historian Abbott
Payson Usher similarly called innovation "the constructive assimilation of
preexisting elements into new syntheses, new patterns, or new
configurations." 40 Innovation, Usher explained, "establishes relationships
that did not previously exist. '"41 The esteemed economists Richard R.
Nelson and Sidney G. Winter echoed Usher and Schumpeter's views.4 2
Nobelist Kenneth Arrow similarly viewed technological information held
by different firms as "the major input" of inventive activity, "apart from the
talent of the inventor." 43 As explained in Part I, experts in some fields call
this type of technological advancement "recombinant innovation.
44
38. Some of history's preeminent scientists and inventors have described the act of
invention as a process of combining and repurposing existing information. In a 1908 essay,
the famed mathematician Henri Poincard explained that he discovered new mathematical
relationships not by happening upon them at chance, but rather by deliberately combining
well-known mathematical concepts ("entities" as he called them) until useful combinations
revealed themselves. HENRI POINCARt, SCIENCE AND METHOD 50-51 (Francis Maitland
trans., Courier Corp. 1914) ("What, in fact, is mathematical discovery? ... Discovery
consists precisely in not constructing useless combinations, but in constructing those that
are useful, which are an infinitely small minority. Discovery is discernment, selection....
Among the combinations we choose, the most fruitful are often those which are formed of
elements borrowed from widely separated domains."). Thus, although Poincar6's creative
process was highly structured, it was not mechanical. "The real work ... is not merely...
manufacturing as many combinations as possible," but rather "in choosing between these
combinations with a view to eliminating those that are useless." Id. at 57.
39. SCHUMPETER, supra note 5, at 84, 88.
40. ABBOTT PAYSON USHER, A HISTORY OF MECHANICAL INVENTIONS 11 (1929).
Interestingly, Usher relied upon this definition to explain mechanical inventions as well as
the creation of artistic works. Id.
41. Id.
42. SCHUMPETER, supra note 5, at 130.
43. Kenneth Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation ofResources for Invention,
in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS
618 (1962); see also Robert P. Merges, Institutionsfor Intellectual Property Transactions:
The Case of Patent Pools, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 125 (Rochelle Dreyfuss et al. eds.,
2000), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/pools.pdf ("Arrow set the stage for a new type
of theory, one that recognized the need to assemble information and property rights from
disparate sources in the process of bringing a product to market.").
44. See, e.g., ANDREW HARGADON, SUSTAINABLE INNOVATION: BUILD YOUR
COMPANY'S CAPACITY TO CHANGE THE WORLD 127-47 (2015).
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It is helpful to note that recombinant innovation is distinct from
"incremental innovation"--a form of technological advancement
frequently discussed by intellectual property scholars.45 Incremental
innovation refers to a vertical process of improving upon existing
technologies. Recombinant innovation, by contrast, involves the horizontal
assembly of complementary technological information from different
sources. 46 The invention of the mimeograph machine is a paradigmatic
example. Thomas Edison developed the device by combining the idea of a
printing press with that of a rapidly moving stylus mechanism used in
automatic telegraph machines.47 Edison did not invent these components
nor did he improve upon them; rather, he combined them in a useful and
complementary way.
4 8
Although intellectual property scholars rarely use the term, the patent
system encourages recombinant innovation. A central goal of the patent
system is to encourage technological progress generally. 49 Even more
specifically though, patent law's "obviousness bar" denies patent protection
45. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive
Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1055 (1989) ("Scientists have been
proclaiming their indebtedness to the research of their predecessors for centuries"); Mark
A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV.
989, 997 (1997) ("Rather, knowledge is cumulative-authors and inventors must
necessarily build on what came before them."); Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the
Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 29
(1991) ("Most innovators stand on the shoulders of giants, and never more so than in the
current evolution of high technologies, where almost all technical progress builds on a
foundation provided by earlier innovators."); Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific
Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 77,
90 (1999) ("The communal character of science is also manifested in a recognition by
scientists of their dependence upon a cumulative cultural heritage.").
46. This is a somewhat stylized dichotomy: many inventions embody a mixture of
incremental and recombinant innovation. Scholars have defined innovation broadly; for
example, innovation has been defined as "the search for, and the discovery, development,
improvement, and adoption of new processes, new products, and new organizational
structures and procedures." Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece, Innovation, Cooperation
and Antitrust, 4 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 5 (1989); see also Andrew Hargadon, Brokering
Knowledge: Linking Learning and Innovation, 24 RES. ORG. BEHAV. 41, 44 (2002)
(presenting case studies that illustrate this point).
47. JAN FAGERBERG ET AL., THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INNOVATION MANAGEMENT
171 (2014).
48. See id. Similar historical examples are legion. As Lee Fleming and Olav Sorenson
have noted, "one might think of the automobile as a combination of the bicycle, the horse
carriage, and the internal combustion engine. The steamship can be characterized as
combining the boat with steam power." Lee Fleming & Olav Sorenson, Technology as a
Complex Adaptive System: Evidence From Patent Data, 30 RES. POL'Y 1019, 1020 (2001).
49. Dan L. Burk, The Role of Patent Law in Knowledge Codification, 23 Berkeley
Tech. L.J. 1009, 1009-10
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to inventions that "would have been obvious.., to a person having ordinary
skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."5 ° This rule denies
patent protection to inventions that cover obvious combinations of prior art
(technological information), while favoring inventors who combine prior
art in ways that are unexpected or that were previously discouraged.5' Patent
law's obviousness bar does not establish a rule that all inventors must
combine existing technological information creatively, of course, but it
clearly rewards inventors who do. 52 In this way, it seems to reflect a policy
judgment that the public stands to benefit when technological information
is combined in unexpected ways. 53
Saurabh Vishnubhakat and Arti Rai recently offered a valuable
empirical view of this phenomenon:
Because the USPTO assigns relevant USPC classifications to each
patent, a patent's classes identify the distinct technologies that the
inventor combined to produce the invention-and the
combination identifies the particular interdisciplinarity at work in
that instance of inventive activity. Historically, the rate at which
50. Laura G. Pedraza-Farifia, Patent Law and the Sociology of Innovation, 2013 Wis.
L. REv. 813, 818 (2013); see also id. at 861 ("First, the obviousness inquiry should be
structured so as to reward, and thus incentivize, those inventions that transport ideas,
techniques, and problems across disciplinary boundaries, especially when vested interests
are likely to delay or block fruitful intersections between communities of practice.").
51. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012) (imposing nonobviousness as a requirement for
patentability).
52. Today, this body of law makes patent protection available (assuming other
threshold requirements are met), to inventors who combine existing ideas and
technological knowledge in unexpected ways, such as when there has been no prior
teaching, suggestion, or motivation to do so. See Justin Lee, How KSR Broadens (Without
Lowering) the Evidentiary Standard of Nonobviousness, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 15, 21
(2008).
53. Federal case law reflects the view that when fields of knowledge are particularly
distinct, "the bringing together of knowledge held in widely diverse fields itself becomes
invention." Johnson & Johnson v. W. L. Gore & Associates, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 704, 723
(D. Del. 1977). Obviousness doctrine has been shaped in many respects by adjudications
of validity challenges asserted against patents that resulted from combinations of two or
more prior art references-i.e., recombinant innovations. See, e.g., Christelle K. Pride,
Misguided Panic and Missed Opportunity for Pharmaceutical Inventions: How
Unexpected Results Eclipsed Reasonable Expectation of Success in BMS v. Teva, 31
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 587, 594 (2016) (considering implications of major nonobviousness
decisions on future trajectory of case law); Tolga S. Gulmen, Model Jury Instructions on
Nonobviousness in the Wake of KSR: The Northern District of California's Approach, 24
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 99, 100-05 (2009) (providing a history of nonobviousness decisions
arising from challenges to recombinant technology patents); Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Formal
Structure of Patent Law and the Limits ofEnablement, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1141, 1162
(2008) (analyzing major obviousness decisions dealing with recombination).
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new inventions have introduced new technological capabilities,
representing new technological classes, has slowed considerably.
Yet surprisingly, the rate at which new combinations of
technological classes have emerged has systematically kept pace
with the number of new patents.
54
Interestingly, federal law is largely unconcerned with whether, as a
preliminary matter, inventors have adequate access to sufficient
technological information that can later be combined.55 The reason for this
sanguine attitude may simply be that such information has often been
widely accessible. The ideas that Thomas Edison recombined into the
mimeograph, for instance, had been described in published patents. 56
Technological information flows through many other channels as well, such
as academic publications and trade journals. 57 Innovative firms can also
acquire technological information by hiring individuals with expertise in
diverse fields, and through corporate mergers and acquisitions. 58 A veritable
subfield of economic and legal scholarship has developed around the study
of how such channels of technological information influence innovation.5 9
54. Saurabh Vishnubhakat & Arti K. Rai, When Biopharma Meets Software:
Bioinformatics at the Patent Office, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 205, 239 (2015).
55. The National Cooperative Research and Production Act is one of the most
significant pieces of legislation at the federal level designed to encourage cooperation
among researchers. National Research and Production Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-06 (2000).
This law and has not been a chief subject of interest among legal scholars focused on
innovation policy, however.
56. See FAGERBERG ET AL., supra note 47, at 171; see also, KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex,
550 U.S. 398, 426-27 (2007) (framing obviousness analysis from the perspective of
persons of ordinary skill in the art); In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 998-1000 (Fed. Cir.
1999) (setting forth "suggestion, teaching, or motivation to combine" as a test for
obviousness).
57. The history of airplane technology includes many examples of information
exchanges yielding innovation. See generally Peter B. Meyer, An Inventive Commons:
Shared Sources of the Airplane and Its Industry, in GOVERNING KNOWLEDGE COMMONS
341 (Brett M. Frischmann, Michael J. Madison & Katherine J. Strandburg eds., 2014).
58. The Ford Motor Company provides a helpful example of how recombinant
innovation can develop through hiring. Ford developed important new methods of building
automobiles by hiring engineers with complementary technical know-how in diverse and
seemingly unrelated fields, including bicycle design and grain processing. DAVID
HOUNSHELL, FROM THE AMERICAN SYSTEM TO MASS PRODUCTION, 1800-1932: THE
DEVELOPMENT OF MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY IN THE UNITED STATES 217-226
(1985). Indeed, "[r]ather than chasing whole new ideas ... Ford focused on recombining
old ideas in new ways." Id. at 217; see also HARGADON, supra note 44, at 133.
59. See generally STEVEN JOHNSON, WHERE GOOD IDEAS COME FROM (2010);
EVERETr M. ROGERS, DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS (2003) (exploring the conditions that
often give rise to innovation and emphasizing the importance of conditions that facilitate
connections between disparate sources of information); Katherine Strandburg et al., Law
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Useful technological information can also be obtained through
licensing, joint development projects, and similar private cooperative
arrangements. 60 The organizational theorist David J. Teece has noted,
"interactions among firms and institutions are important to the innovation
process ... Information exchange and cooperative relationships of various
kinds lie at the heart of ... tremendously innovative assemblage[s] of
physical and human assets." 61 In her work examining the innovative
activities of small firms, Maryann P. Feldman has similarly written,
"interactions and cooperation among autonomous organizations
commanding specialized complementary assets and sources of knowledge
may be critical to innovative success." 62 Andrew Hargadon, who conducted
rich ethnographic studies of corporate innovation yielded from cooperative
information exchange, has consistently explained that because the social
world is "fragmented into many small domains," innovation requires
"bridging multiple domains and moving ideas from where they are known
to where they are not.",63
The foregoing discussion can be reduced to a few concise points: first,
the aggregation of technological information is an important precondition
for innovation; second, the federal government broadly seeks to encourage
such innovation; third, the task of aggregating technological information for
this purpose is largely left up to private actors. Sometimes, useful
information is publicly disclosed (in a published patent or trade publication,
for instance); other times, useful information can be obtained through
private arrangements, including transactions. As the following Section
explains, these concepts are central to a timely policy question.
B. THE DATA-POOLING QUESTION
The recent Big Data phenomenon represents, by all accounts, a new kind
of recombinant innovation. Rather than relying upon combinations of
technological information, data scientists who specialize in Big Data rely
and the Science of Networks: An Overview and an Application to the Patent Explosion, 21
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1293 (2006) (applying network science to examine flows of
technological information).
60. Maryann P. Feldman has noted, however, that large, vertically integrated
companies are "able to internalize innovative inputs and provide complementary assets to
facilitate innovation." Maryann P. Feldman, Knowledge Complementarity and Innovation,
6 SMALL Bus. Eco. 363, 370 (1994).
61. David J. Teece, Information Sharing, Innovation, and Antitrust, 62 ANTITRUST
L.J. 465, 470 (1994).
62. Feldman, supra note 60, at 363.
63. Hargadon, supra note 46, at 44.
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upon combinations of factual information-i.e., data.6 Investors and
technologists have high hopes for this phenomenon. In a 2012 television
interview, a widely-known American venture capitalist famously described
Big Data as the "new oil." 65 Policymakers seem to have embraced this
optimism. As explained in the Introduction, the federal government has
committed over $200 million toward Big Data projects, and the Obama
Administration made the promotion of Big Data an important component of
federal innovation policy.66 In his 2016 State of the Union Address,
President Obama announced that Vice President Joseph Biden would head
a new related initiative called the "Cancer Moonshot. ' ' 67 A major goal of
this initiative is to encourage more robust and effective data sharing. 68
The sources of data that can fuel Big Data practices are myriad, ranging
from smartphones, to social networks, credit card purchase records,
personal health devices, and more.69 Practitioners in this new field seek to
develop valuable algorithms by applying new statistical methods to large
sets of such data. For example, a seemingly unrelated collection of web
search records can reveal where influenza is most likely to next strike;70 a
pool of credit card purchase records can show that people who purchase
small felt pads to protect their floors from furniture damage typically have
64. Contrary to what the term may appear to suggest, "Big Data" refers to a
methodology, and not a particular type or quantity of data. See sources cited supra notes 2,
7. Some researchers call this practice "data-intensive science." THE FOURTH PARADIGM:
DATA-INTENSIVE SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY (Tony Hey, Stewart Tansley & Kristin Tolle eds.,
2009) (coining the term "data-intensive science").
65. This quote has been widely attributed to the venture capitalist Ann L. Winblad.
See, e.g., Perry Rotella, Is Data the New Oil?, FORBES (Apr. 2, 2012, 11:09 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/perryrotella/2012/04/02/is-data-the-new-oil!.
66. See, e.g., supra notes 2, 7 and accompanying text (various leading sources that
describe the Big Data phenomenon).
67. Press Release, White House, Fact Sheet: Investing in the National Cancer
Moonshot (Feb. 1, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/
01 /fact-sheet-investing-national-cancer-moonshot.
68. See TYLER JACKS, ELIZABETH JAFFEE & DINAH SINGER ET AL., CANCER
MOONSHOT BLUE RIBBON PANEL REPORT 3 (2016), https://www.cancer.gov/research/key-
initiatives/moonshot-cancer-initiative/blue-ribbon-pane/blue-ribbon-panel-report-
2016.pdf (describing that a goal of the project is to "[c]reate a National Cancer Data
Ecosystem to collect, share, and interconnect a broad array of large datasets so that
researchers, clinicians, and patients will be able to both contribute and analyze data,
facilitating discovery that will ultimately improve patient care and outcomes."). This
document also explains the importance of obtaining diverse oncology data. Id. at 12.
69. See supra notes 20, 21 and accompanying text (reporting on a variety of situations
where Big Data has been used, including types of data).
70. See, e.g., Jeremy Ginsberg et al., Detecting Influenza Epidemics Using Search
Engine Query Data, 457 NATURE 1012 (2009).
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high credit scores; 7 1 seemingly ordinary shopping records can predict
pregnancy with remarkable accuracy; 72 and the treatment records of one
million cancer patients could offer a good prediction of how well future
patients will fare under a particular course of treatment. 73 These and similar
examples feature prominently in popular books and recent press accounts. 74
As its name suggests, Big Data relies upon vast corpuses of factual
information. 75 Experts have emphasized that the most powerful sets of data
for this purpose are drawn from different sources. In 2012, for example,
IBM collaborated with the carmaker Honda and the Pacific Gas and Electric
Company in California to research the best times and locations for electric
cars to be recharged.76 By pooling historical data from the power grid with
car-generated data and additional data from GPS receivers, IBM was able
to develop an algorithm that determined the ideal locations for car
recharging stations. 77 An expert interviewed for this Article opined that
drawing insights from pooled datasets in this manner is the very essence of
Big Data.78 "The single data set has very little value," she explained, adding
that "[t]he unique intellectual property is from the integration of data sets
and the algorithms that you can generate on top of them. It's much more
[valuable] if you combine, [say], air quality data and behavioral medicine
71. See Paul Ohm & Scott R. Peppet, What ifEverything Reveals Everything?, in BIG
DATA is NOT A MONOLITH 45 (Cassidy R. Sugimoto et al. eds., 2016) (describing this
example in greater detail); MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 2.
72. See MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 2, at 58.
73. The Promise of Big Data for Cancer Patients and Practices, COTA HEALTHCARE
(Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.cotahealthcare.com/post/how-cancer-practices-and-patients-
benefit-from-big-data
74. Algorithms derived from Big Data can have broad utility and some may meet the
threshold requirements for patentability. Ognjen Zivojnovic, Patentable Subject Matter
After Alice-Distinguishing Narrow Software Patents from Overly Broad Business
Method Patents, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 807, 809 (2015). As one attorney for Microsoft
commented in a telephone interview conducted for this Article, "There is valuable IP in the
analytics of big data. Methods of analyzing the data." Telephone Interview with
Anonymous Subject #66, Microsoft (Jan. 22, 2014).
75. See MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 2, at 107 (discussing
"Recombinant Data"); Erik Brynjolfsson & Andrew McAfee, The Innovation Dilemma: Is
America Stagnating?, TALKING POINTS MEMO CAFE (Feb. 11, 2014, 6:01 AM),
http ://talkingpointsmemo.com/cafe/the-innovation-dilemma-is-america-stagnating
("[D]igital innovation is recombinant innovation in its purest form"); Ohm & Peppet, supra
note 71, at 45 (drawing upon a definition coined by Microsoft that involves "seriously
massive and often highly complex sets of information.").
76. See MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 2, at 102-03.
77. Id
78. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Subject #42 (Sept. 19, 2014).
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data and understand the relationship and [discover] some unique
combinatorial issue. 79
This is where a potential problem arises. Much of the data that could
serve as grist for the mill of Big Data inventions is generated and held
privately.80 As a result, the only practical way that many data scientists can
obtain it is through licensing agreements. Theory suggests, however, that
licensing data directly from multiple licensors on the scale necessary to
draw useful insights from it could involve very high transaction costs.
A brief hypothetical can illustrate this problem." Suppose a data
scientist wishes to develop an algorithm that can predict the likely success
of a particular medical treatment. This would-be inventor determines that
developing the algorithm will first require her to identify patterns within
large sets of patient treatment records. The data scientist must then conduct
a search to learn which hospitals, academic research centers, or individuals
hold this data. 2 This preliminary step alone could be costly and time-
consuming. But let us assume the researcher forges ahead and finds that,
say, twenty hospitals and five academic research centers hold the data she
needs. The data scientist must then negotiate licensing agreements with
each data holder. This step could significantly add to her costs. It could
involve hiring a lawyer to draft agreements, holding meetings with each
data holder, and other related costs. Added to these costs is the possibility
that one or more of the data holders will simply refuse to cooperate or hold
out for prohibitively high costs-i.e., the well-known "hold-out" or "hold-
up" problem.8 3 Assessing these transaction costs and risks, the would-be
79. Id.
80. See, e.g., infra Part III.B. (discussing information holdout concerns in context of
cancer research).
81. This hypothetical is modeled upon the cancer-research data landscape, the focus
of the study in Part III of this Article.
82. See, e.g., R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1960)
("In order to carry out a market transaction, it is necessary to discover who it is that one
wishes to deal with, to inform people that one wishes to deal and on what terms, to conduct
negotiations leading up to a bargain, to draw up the contracts, then undertake the inspection
needed to make sure that the terms of the contract are being observed, and so on.").
83. See, e.g., Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent
Pools, and Standard Setting, 1 INNOVATION POL'Y & ECoN. 119-50 (2001) (discussing
patent holdout and license holdup problems); Benjamin C. Li, The Global Convergence of
FRAND Licensing Practices: Towards "Interoperable" Legal Standards, 31 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 429, 436-38 (2016).
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inventor might decide to abandon her plans at the outset. As a result, the
algorithm will never be developed.84
Intellectual property scholars will be quick to recognize this scenario.
Manufactures and service providers face the same situation when they must
license numerous complementary patent rights that apply to a single
product. 85 Researchers could encounter a similar problem when attempting
to license numerous "upstream" patents held by different companies in
order to engage in an avenue of research that will yield a "downstream"
innovation.8 6 Leading commentators have argued that the transaction costs
and holdout risks could appear so high in these situations that the would-be
licensee (i.e., the manufacturer or the researcher) will decide to forego its
plans, leading to a drop in commercialization and innovation. In a seminal
1998 article in Science, Rebecca Eisenberg and Michael Heller described
this problem as one of underuse caused by a proliferation of exclusionary
rights. They called this "The Tragedy of the Anticommons. This term
refers to "The Tragedy of the Commons"-the well understood inverse
problem of overuse caused by a paucity of exclusionary rights. 88 Since the
time of that publication, the existence and severity of this problem have
been widely debated but the term has stuck.89 Although data generally
enjoys thin formal intellectual property protection and hence weaker
exclusionary rights as compared to patents, the analogy still seems apt: trade
secrecy, contracts, and practical measures such as encryption can
discourage unlicensed uses of data to varying degrees.
90
Patent holders have sometimes addressed these kinds of dilemmas by
forming patent pools-institutions through which patent holders offer to
license a collection of related complementary patents under a unified
84. The economist, political theorist, and Nobelist Kenneth Arrow once hinted at this
possibility when he wrote that information is an important "input" to the process of
innovation, but that aggregating information from multiple sources is likely fraught with
transactional difficulties. Arrow, supra note 43, at 615.
85. Jeremy Mulder, The Aftermath of eBay: Predicting When District Courts Will
Grant Permanent Injunctions in Patent Cases, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 67, 84 (2007)
(describing this problem as a "patent thicket" and explaining how it inhibits innovation).
86. Id.
87. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698-701 (1998).
88. See id
89. Matthew D. Satchwell, The Tao of Open Source: Minimum Action for Maximum
Gain, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1757, 1763 (2005) (referencing the "now famous tragedy
of the anticommons" as an established part of the intellectual property literature base).
90. Mattioli, supra note 13.
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agreement at a standard rate.9 1 A central administrator typically licenses the
collected patent rights, collects royalties, and distributes those sums to the
patent holders according to a formula agreed upon beforehand. 92 This
approach dramatically reduces the transaction costs that would otherwise
proliferate and stall the productive use of the patents. 93 Rather than needing
to search for relevant patent holders and negotiate a series of licenses,
prospective licensees (i.e., manufacturers, service providers, and
researchers) can simply approach a single pool for a license offered at a
standard rate. 94 In a recent article, Robert P. Merges and I demonstrated that
patent pools routinely conserve vast transaction costs within technology
markets. 95
It may seem appealing, then, to think that pooling is a viable solution to
the problem of aggregating data. A data pool structured similarly to a patent
pool might facilitate the aggregation of related data and spur innovation.
This idea seems to have resonated with executives, technologists, and
scientists in a number of industries that are embracing Big Data. 96 As Part
III of this Article explores, experts in the field of cancer research are
attempting to assemble such data pools as of this writing.97
As attractive as data pooling might seem, this cooperative model might
not address some of the most important costs and problems associated with
large-scale data licensing. Data holders who wish to form a pool would
likely incur high costs just to make their data usable to others.98 Data holders
must maintain ever-expanding sets of data on an ongoing basis; they must
ensure that this data is stored in formats that permit future use; they must
verify the accuracy of the data, and if possible, correct errors or ambiguities
in it; and the law may require a data holder to alter its data in order to
91. See generally Shapiro, supra note 83; Merges, supra note 13, at 1293; Merges,
supra note 43, at 123, 129-30, 132, 144; Mattioli, supra note 13, at 421.
92. Id.
93. See Robert P. Merges & Michael Mattioli, Measuring the Costs and Benefits of
Patent Pools, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract id=2759027 (estimating transaction cost savings).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See, e.g., supra notes 20-28.
97. The examples studied in this Article are based upon this hope. See also MAYER-
SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 2, at 147-48 ("More likely, we'll see the advent of
new firms that pool data from many consumers, provide an easy way to license it, and
automate the transactions.").
98. Jorge L. Contreras, Data Sharing, Latency Variables, and Science Commons, 25
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1601, 1165 (2010) (describing database creation costs in analogous
context).
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preserve the privacy of individuals, among other barriers. 99 As Arti Rai has
written, settings where health data is pooled "raise major transaction cost
challenges, particularly to the extent data holders cannot guarantee that de-
identified or anonymized data is impervious to re-identification."' 100 As
Amitai Aviram and Avishalom Tor observed before the advent of Big Data,
the cost of establishing institutions to aid information exchanges could be
costly enough to discourage such cooperation."0 ' Moreover, data holders
may often need to maintain and share clear records of the foregoing steps-
i.e., "metadata" reflecting the provenance and pedigree of the underlying
data-which they have weak incentives to document and disclose.
10 2
Apart from these upfront costs, a vast body of scholarship from different
disciplines suggests that pooling data is inherently problematic due to free-
rider problems. 10 3 Literature on this subject is, in fact, too large to
99. Mattioli, supra note 13.
100. Arti K. Rai, Risk Regulation and Innovation: The Case of Rights-Encumbered
Biomedical Data Silos, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1641 (2017).
101. Avishalom Tor & Amitai Aviram, Overcoming Impediments to Information
Sharing, 55 ALA. L. REv. 231 (2003). Standard-setting is an important counterexample,
however. When companies within an industry jointly develop a new technological
standard, they will often agree beforehand to abide by certain information-sharing rules.
Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, A Simple Approach to Setting Reasonable Royalties for
Standard-Essential Patents, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1135, 1136-37 (2013). These rules
are typically promulgated and enforced by standard-setting organizations-institutions
composed of a variety of private and public actors. Id. The International Organization for
Standardization ("ISO"), which oversees the development of the MPEG video standard,
for instance, requires its members to disclose information about patents relevant to the joint
enterprise and to relinquish any claims of copyright they might assert over such disclosures.
Christopher S. Gibson, Globalization and the Technology Standards Game: Balancing
Concerns of Protectionism and Intellectual Property in International Standards, 22
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1403, 1481 (2007). The ISO also serves as a platform for the sharing
of technological information (e.g., know-how, ideas, etc.) that leads to the development of
mature standards. This process does not always go smoothly, however: legal scholars have
observed that firms involved in standard-setting projects are often hesitant to disclose
information to other members that might advantage their competitors. Id. at 1436
(describing an examine involving Chinese unwillingness to disclose state-owned trade
secrets).
102. As I noted in a previous publication, data holders have few incentives to disclose
such information, whereas patent holders must disclose a great deal of detail as a condition
of the patent application process. See generally Mattioli, supra note 13.
103. Mokyr, supra note 17. Some might argue problem is aggravated by the relatively
thin intellectual property protection U.S. law affords factual information such as data. See,
e.g., Charles C. Huse, Database Protection in Theory and Practice: Three Recent Cases,
20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 23, 24 (2005). Facts typically fall below the "originality"
threshold of copyright law and outside of the defined classes of patentable subject matter.
Id. As a result, holders of most kinds of data typically have a limited set of tools at their
disposal to prevent misappropriation. See generally Jacqueline Lipton, Balancing Private
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adequately summarize here. For purposes of this discussion, however, the
work of two key scholars, Kenneth Arrow and Elinor Ostrom, is helpful to
note. 1°4 Arrow identified a few interrelated challenges on this point: First,
potential buyers or licensees of information sometimes cannot ascertain its
value without first examining it-a result that sometimes negates the need
for exchange in the first place.105 Second, an actor who sells information on
the open market risks suffering a loss in value if the buyer duplicates and
redistributes that information.'0 6 Third, the demand for information can
often be low when potential licensees who wish to use it as an "input" to
the invention process see its value as highly speculative.' 0 7 In Arrow's view,
these "restriction[s] on the transmittal of information will reduce the
efficiency of inventive activity in general and will therefore reduce its
quantity also."'' 0
8
Elinor Ostrom's scholarship offers some equally important and relevant
insights. Ostrom is perhaps known best for the vivid portraits she depicted
of self-governing communities that manage shared resources, at times
avoiding the so-called "Tragedy of the Commons." Her 2012 book
UNDERSTANDING KNOWLEDGE AS A COMMONS was motivated by these
concerns and provides a roadmap for scholars to examine knowledge-
sharing ethnographically. 10 9 Although research questions related to
knowledge sharing could be examined through many lenses, Ostrom's
framework is designed to capture important factors that might otherwise go
overlooked-how characteristics of the information being shared and the
Rights and Public Policies: Reconceptualizing Property in Databases, 18 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 773 (2003). These tools include trade secrecy, contracts, and practical barriers
such as encryption. Id. at 786-87. From the perspective of data holders, these options are
weaker than intellectual property rights in a critical respect, however: they cannot be used
to stop unwanted uses of data that have already been widely disclosed. M. Scott McBride,
Bioinformatics and Intellectual Property Protection, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1331, 1354-
55 (2002). That is, trade secrets, contracts, and encryption do not provide data holders with
a mechanism to enjoin widespread unlicensed downstream reproduction and use. Id. When
data is widely disclosed, the genie is often simply out of the bottle. Id
104. A third scholar whose work may shed useful light on the subject is Friedrich
Hayek, whose examined this theme-which he referred to as "The Knowledge Problem"-
quite extensively. See generally FRIEDRICH HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY
(1960).
105. See Dan L. Burk & Brett H. McDonnell, The Goldilocks Hypothesis: Balancing
Intellectual Property Rights at the Boundary of the Firm, 2007 U. ILL. L. REv. 575, 585
(2007) (discussing this problem as it relates to trade secrecy).
106. Arrow, supra note 43.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See generally UNDERSTANDING KNOWLEDGE AS A COMMONS (Charlotte Hess &
Elinor Ostrom eds., 2007).
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broader cultural, legal, and economic context can influence sharing, for
instance.11° Ostrom and the many scholars she inspired showed through
ethnographic studies that the problems of sharing technological information
are often nuanced, and more complicated than theory alone suggests.
11
Katherine Strandburg, Michael Madison, and Brett Frischmann have
advanced this area of study in important ways, including through the
development of the "Knowledge Commons" research framework-an
approach to studying information-sharing institutions inspired by Ostrom's
work. 112
Ultimately, the work of Arrow, Ostrom, and others indicates that
pooling information can present a classic "social dilemma"-i.e., a situation
"in which each member of a group has a clear and unambiguous incentive
to make a choice that, when made by all members, provides poorer
outcomes for all than they would have received if none had made the
choice."" 3 Based upon this, there is good reason to expect efforts to pool
data will often be unsuccessful, thus impeding the development of Big Data
innovations. Stated differently, data may not be pooled frequently enough
or widely enough to spur meaningful technological advances.
Recent scholarly and press accounts seem to support these concerns.
Economists have recently doubted that Big Data will ever carry economic
or social benefits;'14 one distinguished academic commentator recently
predicted that Big Data will be "far less important than the great innovations
of the 19th and 20th centuries. ' "5 Press reports of data-sharing failures
seem to support these doubts.1 16 One notable example was the failed UK
110. Id.
111. See generally id. (exploring many possible conditions that could lead to failed
information exchanges). The ethnographic study presented in Part III of this Article was
conducted according to Ostrom's Institutional Analysis and Development ("lAD")
methodological framework.
112. See generally GOVERNING KNOWLEDGE COMMONS (Brett M. Frischmann,
Michael J. Madison & Katherine J. Strandburg eds., 2014); UNDERSTANDING KNOWLEDGE
AS A COMMONS, supra note 109; ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE
EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990).
113. Dawes & Messick, supra note 18, at 111-16 (defining social choice problems or
social dilemmas).
114. See Glantz, supra note 20.
115. See Marcus & Davis, supra note 20.
116. See e.g., John Markoff, Troves of Personal Data, Forbidden to Researchers, N.Y.
TIMES (May 21, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/22/science/big-data-troves-stay-
forbidden-to-social-scientists.html (reporting on widely-held concerns by scientific
researchers who believe that private data-holders are impeding research through their
unwillingness to share data that is useful for Big Data projects); Bernardo A. Huberman,
Sociology of Science: Big Data Deserve a Bigger Audience, 482 NATURE 308 (2012)
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National Health Service's National Programme for IT.1 7 The plan, which
was to pool patient medical records under a single roof, collapsed in large
part because data holders (mostly hospitals) had strong disincentives to
share information widely.118
Legal and economic scholarship written before the age of Big Data
further supports the prediction of a Big Data anticommons. Pamela
Samuelson and J.H. Reichman warned in the 1990s that information-
sharing failures threatened to slow the pace of federally-funded scientific
research.'1 9 Scholars of management have documented how the same types
of cooperative problems impede information sharing within corporations.' 20
Paul Uhlir and J.H. Reichman have noted that the severity of the problem
may increase when diverse institutions are concerned and suggest that
antitrust law might further discourage the pooling of data:
The evidence shows that such [database] pools are very difficult
to form when the value of upstream research products defies easy
measurement and the relevant players in a given industry have
very different agendas, as would occur when federal agencies,
academic institutions, and different types of private companies are
all involved. Moreover, there are far greater risks that such pools
lead to collusive, anti-competitive behavior, to the erection of
formidable barriers to entry.1
2 1
("Many of the emerging 'big data' come from private sources that are inaccessible to other
researchers."); Brett Hemenway & Bill Welser, Cryptographers Could Prevent Satellite
Collisions, Scl. AM. (Feb. 1, 2015), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/
cryptographers-could-prevent-satellite-collisions/ (describing incident where U.S. and
Russian satellites collided because both governments kept orbital data secret due); Austin
Frakt,Addiction Research and Care Collide With Federal Privacy Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
27, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/28/upshot/federal-push-for-privacy-
hampers-addiction-research-and-care.html (reporting how privacy regulations prompted
insufficient disclosure of health records maintained by the federal government).
117. See Rajeev Syal, Abandoned NHS IT System Has Cost £lObn So Far, GUARDIAN
(Sept. 17, 2013, 7:06 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/society/2013/sep/1 8/nhs-records-
system- 1 Obn.
118. See Lizzie Presser et al., Care.data and Access to UK Health Records: Patient
Privacy and Public Trust, TECH. SC. (Aug. 11, 2015), http://techscience.org/a/
2015081103/.
119. J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 50
VAND. L. REv. 51, 56 (1997) (arguing that propertization of data would impede scientific
progress and exchange).
120. Ulrike Cress et al., Information Exchange With Shared Databases as a Social
Dilemma, 33 CoMM. RES. 370 (2006) ("When group members exchange information via
shared databases people are often reluctant to contribute information they possess.").
121. J.H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, A Contractually Reconstructed Research
Commons for Scientific Data in A Highly Protectionist Intellectual Property Environment,
2017l
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Press accounts of Big Data innovations loosely align with these concerns.
The most notable examples of Big Data innovations in practice have been
developed by large, vertically-integrated firms that drew upon their own
vast internal datasets, rather than through cooperative exchanges. 
122
Will data-pooling problems dampen innovation? Policymakers should
be concerned by this possibility. As explained in Part II, barriers to data
pooling could subvert recent federal policies designed to promote Big
Data.123 The patent system's goal of promoting technological progress is
implicated by the success of data pooling as well. Recent Supreme Court
jurisprudence has called the patentability of some kinds of software
algorithms into question.124 In particular, the decision in Alice Corp. v. CLS
Bank International has cast doubts on the patentability of at least some
kinds of patent claims pertaining to algorithms while providing only murky
guidance on how such subject matter might qualify for patent protection. 125
But even so, experts believe Big Data has enormous potential to impact
innovation. An unpatentable algorithm might open the door to new classes
of patentable technologies and fields of research. The underlying policy
concern thus seems clear: federal innovation policy seeks to promote
technological advances that may not come about due to data-pooling
problems.
Because of Big Data's immense and unrealized potential to stimulate
and generate innovation, policymakers can benefit from understanding how
successfully private actors are pooling useful data. To that end, the
following Section presents an original ethnographic study of recent efforts
to pool data in an important field of research.
66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBs. 315,403-04 (2003). The "database pools" these authors posited
would be similar to patent pools in some respects. See id.
122. See supra notes 21-27.
123. See supra Part II.
124. See, e.g., Merges, supra note 29 (discussing the implications of the recent Alice
decision on the patentability of software methods, including algorithms related to data).
125. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). For an example
of such commentary, see, e.g., Merges, supra note 29.
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III. A STUDY OF RECENT DATA-POOLING EFFORTS IN
CANCER RESEARCH 126
Is Big Data likely to develop into a thriving platform for innovation?
According to experts in this new field, the answer to this question will hinge
upon how effectively data held by different firms, institutions, and
individuals can be aggregated. Here, this question is explored through an
original ethnographic study of several burgeoning efforts to pool cancer
treatment and research data. 12
7
A. STUDY METHODOLOGY
The decision to focus this study on cancer treatment and research data
was motivated primarily by the fact that cancer research is one of few fields
where data holders have sought to organize pools in order to advance
innovation.' 28 As a result, the setting is ripe for investigation. Secondly, as
mentioned in the Introduction, the federal government has publicly
applauded efforts to pool cancer treatment and research data. 1
29
It is important to note, however, that this study's focus on cancer
treatment and research data necessarily limits the extent to which its
findings can be generalized. This study does not aim to conclusively prove
or disprove the existence of a widespread data-pooling problem. The goal
here is more modest. This is an investigation designed to learn whether the
data-pooling problem predicted by theory is playing out in an important
field of research. A secondary goal of this article is to serve as a model for
how data-pooling problems in other industry and research settings can be
examined and addressed in the future.
The organizations examined in this study were all founded on a simple,
hopeful thesis: if medical data (e.g., patient treatment data, drug trial
observations, etc.) is pooled on a large scale, data scientists will be able to
develop algorithms that predict how well future patents will respond to
certain therapies. The goal is not to invent new treatments, but rather to
develop new methods of prescribing existing treatments. CancerLinQ, a
126. A companion chapter to this study appears in a forthcoming book published by
Cambridge University Press. That chapter covers aspects of the history of data in the field
of medicine and the field of oncology data not presented here. Cancer: From a Kingdom
to a Commons, in GOVERNING MEDICAL KNOWLEDGE COMMONS (eds. Katherine
Strandburg, Brett Frischmann & Michael J. Madison, 2017).
127. This study received necessary Institutional Review Board approval from Indiana
University.
128. These organizations were selected for study because they were reported on with
the greatest frequency in the national press the time this study was conducted.
129. See supra notes 24-27.
20171
BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 32:179
project under the direction of the American Society of Clinical Oncology
("ASCO"), is an early-stage effort to pool cancer treatment data from
hospitals and individual practices across the United States.130 The White
House has commended CancerLinQ as an exemplar of the potential for
social good that Big Data holds.' 3 Project Data Sphere, a second group
studied, is a research joint venture that has drawn the participation of several
large pharmaceutical companies, including Celgene, Pfizer, and Sanofi.1
32
The project, which began in 2012, aims to improve cancer treatment by
pooling clinical drug trial data. 133 A third organization, CancerCommons,
also aims to facilitate innovations in cancer care. 134 Unlike CancerLinQ and
Project Data Sphere, however, CancerCommons seeks treatment data from
individual patients. 135 A final initiative examined is the Data Alliance
Collaborative ("DAC"). The DAC, which was organized by Premier
Healthcare in 2013, seeks to pool Big Data methods and processes between
member hospitals. 136 For instance, by pooling patient treatment records
from different cities, members of the group have developed an algorithm
that predicts the likelihood that future patients will be readmitted. 1
37
Interview subjects were identified by a variety of means. Some were
placed in contact with me by the data pools they worked with. Others were
contacted directly because they had been quoted or otherwise mentioned in
press accounts of the data pools studied. Some subjects provided
introductions to additional interview subjects experienced with pooling
health-related data. This second tier of interviewees, which included
bioinformaticists at the National Institutes of Health, professors of medicine
at leading research universities, and other prominent players in the field,
provided context and outside perspectives on the institutions examined. All
interview subjects were selected based upon their experience in the field
130. ASCO CancerLinQ: Learning Intelligence Network for Quality, AM. SOC'Y OF
CLINICAL ONCOLOGY, http://www.cancerlinq.org (last visited Aug. 13, 2017).
131. Press Release, supra note 24, at 2.
132. Press Release, Project Data Sphere, CEO Roundtable on Cancer Launches the
Project Data Sphere Initiative, A New Data Sharing and Analytic Platform for Cancer
Patient Benefit (Apr. 8, 2014), https://www.projectdatasphere.org/projectdatasphere/html/
PressRelease/LAUNCH.
133. Id.
134. About Us, CANCER COMMONS, https://www.cancercommons.org/about/ (last
visited Aug. 10, 2015).
135. Id.
136. See Shape the Future of Healthcare Data and Care Delivery Models, PREMIER,
INC., https://www.premierinc.com/transforming-healthcare/quality-improvement-in-
healthcare/data-alliance-collaborative/ (last visited Aug. 12, 2017).
137. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Subject #17, member, Data Alliance
Collaborative (Sept. 10, 2014).
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(e.g., their credentials and work history), and their willingness to
participate. All interviews lasted at least thirty minutes, were audio recorded
with the permission of the interview subjects, and were later transcribed.138
Follow-up interviews were conducted with nearly all subjects. Some
interview subjects agreed to be identified by name, while others agreed to
be quoted only if they were identified as anonymous subjects. This latter
group of subjects have been identified in the footnotes anonymously with
unique identifying numbers.
An important, and perhaps unavoidable, limitation of this study is that
it includes only the insights of individuals who agreed to be interviewed.
This means that the study may not capture the full range of opinions that
exist on this topic-i.e., that the results presented here are biased in some
way. Nonetheless, even if the picture presented here is incomplete, the
insights offered are still helpful and relevant to the research question that
motivated this study.
Methodologically, this study's ethnographic approach was inspired by
the classical TAD framework developed by the Nobelist ethnographer Elinor
Ostrom. Aspects of the study were also greatly influenced by the recent
adaptation of Ostrom's lAD's framework by "Knowledge Commons"
pioneers Katherine Strandburg, Michael Madison, and Brett Frischmann.139
In practical terms, this entailed asking subjects a semi-structured set of
interview questions that fell into the following categories: (i) background
industry environment and context; (ii) the characteristics of the data or
informational resources being shared, and skills needed to create or prepare
these resources; (iii) the "default" status of the data to be shared, (iv) the
identities of the firms or institutions participating; (v) the goals and
objectives of the data-sharing project; (vi) any institutional governance
mechanisms, such as information-sharing rules that members promise to
abide by; and, (vii) technological infrastructure. 140
Three themes emerged from these interviews, each of which is explored
in the following subsections. The most significant finding is that the chief
impediments to the pooling of cancer treatment data are not the free-rider
problems that theory predicts. The pooling of cancer treatment and research
data in the United States appears to be significantly impeded by concerns
regarding professional, competitive, and reputational standing. The details
138. Several interview subjects participated in this study on the condition of
anonymity. These individuals are identified in this article as "Anonymous Subject"
followed by a unique identifying number.
139. See generally GOVERNING KNOWLEDGE COMMONS, supra note 112; OSTROM,
supra note 112; UNDERSTANDING KNOWLEDGE AS A COMMONS, supra note 109.
140. See GOVERNING KNOWLEDGE COMMONS, supra note 112, at 20-21.
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of these concerns are laid out in the sections that follow and are analyzed in
Section IV. A second hindrance to data-pooling is the cost of preparing data
for exchange, a topic briefly touched upon in Part II. A third hindrance is
that potential data contributors are often doubtful that the benefits of sharing
data with a pool will outweigh the necessary costs and risks. The possible
reach of these findings, and whether they are worrisome enough to prompt
policy action, are considered in Section IV of this Article.
Some interview subjects offered global comments that helpfully
captured the challenges of pooling cancer treatment and research data. As
the CEO of a data-pooling non-profit remarked, "everyone is behaving in
an economically rational way because everyone has incentives to not share.
Everyone is competing for everything-from patients, to grant dollars, to
tenure, to vacations, to promotions."14 A prominent professor of medicine
involved in several oncology data-pooling projects echoed this view,
commenting that those who hold valuable data have "every incentive not to
share" and that "some of the most important data live at the places that have
the least interest in sharing.'
142
B. COMPETITIVE CONCERNS
Subjects interviewed for this Article reported that many of the
institutions that hold valuable cancer-related data are reluctant to share it
widely because doing so might cost them reputational harm or a competitive
edge. The precise nature of these concerns is contextual, varying from one
data holder to another, but the overall result is the same: a decision not to
cooperate.
Subjects reported that some hospitals and cancer care centers do not
wish to disclose patient treatment data because doing so could publicize
unfavorable information about the quality of care their institutions provide.
One subject reported that a representative of a large medical institution told
him, "the reason we don't want to share this data is that we are afraid people
will use it to compare our outcomes with other institutions in an
inappropriate way."14 3 The subject made it clear that he was paraphrasing
this remark but added that it was consistent with his own first-hand
observations. Another subject described this phenomenon in more dramatic
terms: "Hospitals reason, 'I'm going to get sued as soon as anyone can see
how many people died from leaving sponges in bodies.' So they have a
disincentive from a liability perspective to share."' 144 Another subject
141. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Subject #57 (Aug. 29, 2014).
142. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Subject #42 (Sept. 19, 2014).
143. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Subject #57 (Aug. 29, 2014).
144. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Subject #44 (Sept. 11, 2014).
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elaborated by explaining the kinds of valuable information patient treatment
data can hold:
I've seen hospitals reluctant to share [patient treatment] data
because of market advantages. Often the information contains
financial information. Overall, a lot of healthcare data also has
trade secrets embedded in it. It's how you're planning your
primary care network to basically act as a referral into your
hospital network-that kind of stuff can be figured out by seeing
where patients are coming in, and that kind of thing. I've seen a
lot of reluctance [to share] that kind of information. And certainly
reluctance on cost and charge information, because it can reveal
[what the hospital] is getting paid for which procedures. Also, at
the doctor level: Doctors are reticent to see patient information
shared because it could expose the hospital to greater risks of
malpractice. So, there's a lot of worry, and it's totally
reasonable. 145
Subjects also reported that concerns about patient privacy discourage
some hospitals and cancer care centers from pooling data. Disclosing
private patient data could lead to reputational harm, subjects explained, but
also liability under privacy-related laws-most notably, the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA). 146
"[T]here's this enormous liability risk of brokering access to de-identified
data for research when you've been using it identified for quality
improvement or for treatment and payment," explained one subject. 147
"That risk really blocks a lot of things."'' 48 Added another subject, "the big
cancer centers, those that are not sharing data, will cite HIPAA ... [I]t is a
well-intentioned thing to protect patient privacy [but] it has really stymied
medical research.' ' 149 Interestingly, several experts suggested that HIPAA
provides a plausible excuse for institutions that do not wish to share data for
reasons unrelated to privacy, such as reputational concerns. This argument
is "particularly hard to argue with," one subject stated. 150
Subjects reported that pharmaceutical companies harbor similar
concerns about reputational or competitive harm. "There are IP concerns
when talking to pharmaceutical companies ... [are] they going to lose
145. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Subject #42 (Sept. 2, 2016).
146. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(e) (2013) (forbidding institutions from disclosing data that
contains names, zip codes, treatment dates, and other related information).
147. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Subject #44 (Sept. 11, 2014).
148. Id.
149. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Subject #57 (Aug. 29, 2014).
150. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Subject #42 (Sept. 19, 2014).
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something if they give away the data?" one subject stated. 151 The former
Chief Product Officer of one effort, Project Data Sphere, elaborated on why
some pharmaceutical companies may understandably be reluctant to share
"core" clinical trial data with a pool composed of competitors:
If you share the core, central data, that data may remove a little bit
of a competitive edge in certain companies, and the competition
among those companies is a crucial part of the model of generating
innovation. 152
This interview subject emphasized, however, that the core competitive data
is "just a fraction" of the data, and that pooling of "non-core" data-i.e.,
data that holds no immediate competitive value--can still "advance the field
tremendously."'15 3 The subject indicated that changes in culture and in
corporate governance could open the door to greater sharing of this kind of
data:
There are cultural barriers, there is the fear of competitiveness,
and also, sharing data is not built into the policies of all the
companies, so all the governance reviews and the decision making
are awkward because they are completely outside of the regular
work that they have. So those are barriers, you see. 15
4
These comments are consistent with at least one recent industry report that
concluded, "companies are reluctant to share proprietary information-
even when anonymity is assured-for fear of losing competitive
advantage."'55
Subjects also reported that academic researchers, a large and important
class of cancer data holders, face strong competitive disincentives to
disclose their data with pools. As a professor of medicine at a leading U.S.
research university involved with oncology data pooling explained:
There is not a culture in academia to promote [data] sharing
because the culture is exactly the opposite: It's protection of
information to keep from getting scooped. The only way to protect
yourself is to wall-off or circumscribe the information that you
151. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Subject #29 (Aug. 26, 2014).
152. Telephone Interview with Kald Abdullah (August 29, 2016).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. James Manyika et al., Open Data: Unlocking Innovation and Performance With





uniquely have access to and even if you don't do anything with it
today at least nobody else is doing anything with it either. 156
According to this subject, academic researchers often feel so reluctant to
share data that they will purposefully obscure it even when a federal grant-
funding agency requires its disclosure. The subject called this behavior
"data-dumping," explaining, "[i]t's very similar to when there is a
requirement to share documents [in the course of a litigation] and you
essentially overwhelm the other team with too many documents." 157
In addition to institutions, medical professionals, and academics,
patients themselves may fear that contributing to a data pool could lead to
reputational, professional, and pecuniary harm. Subjects explained that
patients often worry, for instance, that widespread disclosure of their health
data will jeopardize their privacy or negatively influence how employers,
financial lenders, or insurers will treat them. "There's a lot of fear around
the negative externalities of sharing," one subject explained. "Losing health
insurance, losing long term care insurance, losing employment
opportunities, being embarrassed, being discriminated against, being unable
to find dates, that sort of thing."15 8 These comments are corroborated by
recent press reports on point. 159 When asked to explain how disclosing one's
health data could impact employment, for instance, the subject provided an
unsettling hypothetical:
Let's say that we figure out a set of genetic mutations and
variations that give you an 85-percent chance of developing
Alzheimer's disease early-before age 50. I'm 42 right now. Let's
say I have these mutations and in five years, my genome is
156. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Subject #42 (Sept. 19, 2014). These
comments are consistent with the observations of Elinor Ostrom and her collaborators.
AMY R. POTEETE, MARCO A. JANSSEN & ELINOR OSTROM, WORKING TOGETHER:
COLLECTIVE ACTION, THE COMMONS, AND MULTIPLE METHODS IN PRACTICE 263-64
(2010) ("Some scholars have opposed blanket data-sharing policies out of a concern that
such policies would either disadvantage research that relies on less standardized forms of
qualitative data, or compromise the anonymity of respondents who provide sensitive
information.").
157. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Subject #42 (Sept. 19, 2014).
158. Id.
159. See, e.g., Stephen F. DeAngelis, Patient Monitoring, Big Data, and the Future of
Healthcare, WIRED (Aug. 2014), http://www.wired.com/2014/08/patient-monitoring-big-
data-future-healthcare/ (reporting a reluctance on the part of patience and opining that "[i]t
is more understandable why people would be reluctant to share personal health information
in countries like the U.S. where it could be used to justify significant increases in health
insurance costs.").
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[available to potential employers] online. Who's going to hire
me? 160
The subject emphasized that perception of risk, even if unfounded, may be
enough to discourage data sharing. 161 As a result, useful data from healthy
individuals may be particularly difficult to obtain. "People who self-identify
as healthy have very few incentives to share their health data unless they
buy into it philosophically," commented one subject whose field of work
focuses on facilitating patient data sharing.
162
Other subjects expressed the opinion that it is reasonable for patients to
have such concerns. A doctor and professor of medicine with prior
involvement in an oncology data pool stated, "You know, insurers of course
are very interested in having their hands on all of the information because
it allows them to know [what] rates to charge." '1 63 Another subject
explained, troublingly, that masking an individual's identity in compliance
with HIPAA does not necessarily reduce privacy risks because "[r]e-
identifying patients is becoming very easy with the right computer program,
even off of genomic data sets."'164 Most subjects explained that, in light of
these concerns, patients are likely to either not share their data at all, or to
do so with only very highly trusted brokers.
The data pools examined are addressing these widespread perceptions
of risk by tailoring their approaches in interesting ways. For instance,
Project Data Sphere requires its licensees to agree that they "will not seek,
and will not support any third party's effort to seek, patent protection in any
jurisdiction for any research procedure or research design that results from
... use of the Data or User Contributions." 165 The group is also attempting
to minimize the competitive risk pharmaceutical firms perceive by
collecting only a sub-category of clinical trial data that holds little
commercial value for its members but may, once aggregated, yield useful
results. "We did it in a way that was relatively low risk by asking for the
comparator arms [and] not the experimental [arm]," explained a senior
executive with the project. 166 "So you can keep your IP close at hand, but
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Subject #44 (Sept. 11, 2014).
163. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Subject #51 (Aug. 26, 2014).
164. Id.; see generally Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the
Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REv. 1701 (2010) (calling attention to
this problem).
165. Project Data Sphere Online Service User Agreement, PROJECTDATASPHERE.ORG
(on file with the author).
166. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Subject #29 (Aug. 26, 2014).
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the opportunities with the data itself are tremendous. I mean, you can work
on standards, you can work in how data are collected, you can look at end-
point, you can look at progression of end-point selection, you can look at
subpopulation... you can do all kind of things."' 67
Other interviewees expressed doubts, however, about the likely efficacy
of these approaches. Referring to Project Data Sphere's decision to collect
only a narrow category of data, one interview subject commented, "I am not
trying to say anything negative, but what are they sharing? The data on the
control arms for small drugs? How remote can you be?"' 68 This subject later
amended his comment, however, stating, "But it may have value to patients.
In fact, sometimes controls and failed trials can sometimes be more
interesting than the trial arms."' 69 Not referring to Project Data Sphere,
another subject stated that any data pool composed of only one type of data
risks missing the grand opportunity of Big Data. "If I could [pool] prostate
cancer patients' [data] together, I'd understand the story of prostate cancer
better," the subject commented, "But that's not the real deal. The real deal
is when you find the intersection between many things that otherwise could
not be intersected."'' 70 The subject went on to describe a recent academic
study that uncovered a correlation between cancer and certain
environmental factors by pooling hospital records with weather data. 171
Ironically, competitive concerns may also discourage data pools
themselves from sharing data. Referring to recent efforts to gather cancer
treatment data, one subject explained:
So these organizations [pools] don't necessarily want to share with each
other, because they're competing for dollars and oxygen in the
community; They're competing to be 'The Group,' right? And so
ironically, although it would be better for the people that they purport to
serve that they all share data with each other, frequently they don't, right,
either for competitive reasons or because it doesn't occur to them. 7
Other subjects consistently commented that it has become common for
burgeoning data aggregators in this field to trumpet the virtues of sharing
data to the outside world while maintaining high barriers for researchers
who wish to access the data. As one subject remarked, "This is really about
externally stating that sharing is important but internally creating hurdles
167. Id. ("The majority of the data are phase-three cancer clinical trials, so it is hard
end-point data from blood pressure to PSA readings, to basically everything: end points,
death, life ... various things.").
168. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Subject #71 (Aug. 29, 2014).
169. Id.
170. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Subject #42 (Sept. 19, 2014).
171. Id.
172. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Subject #44 (Sept. 11, 2014).
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that make using data nearly impossible. Because now you can, as you set
the threshold, gate when people cross over the threshold."1 73 Another
subject explained that overcoming the high barriers set by data aggregators
led him to seek data from individual patients. His organization's goal, he
stated, is to "[g]et it out of those silos."'1 74
C. COSTS OF OBTAINING AND PREPARING DATA FOR POOLING
Interview subjects reported that accessing, organizing, and preparing
data for exchange carries significant upfront costs. Before primary holders
of useful health data-hospitals and specialty care centers, doctors, and
academic research institutions-can pool data, they must translate it into
common formats, confirm its accuracy, correct any errors, and obfuscate
details that could be used to identify individual patients. In addition to
identifying these technical hurdles, subjects reported a variety of
institutional, cultural, and contractual barriers that also discourage the
pooling of cancer treatment data.
Patient treatment records constitute one of the most important forms of
data sought by the groups interviewed by this study. These are records of
care that patients receive from healthcare providers such as hospitals. An
interviewee involved with CancerLinQ helpfully divided this type of data
into two broad categories: "structured" and "unstructured."1 75 Structured
patient treatment data, this subject explained, includes objective, machine-
recorded facts such as "laboratory test results or the dosages of medicines
prescribed, or patient vital signs," whereas unstructured data is generated
and recorded more casually and based upon more subjective observations-
a clinical physician's handwritten observations, for example.1
76
Healthcare providers typically store structured and unstructured data in
patients' electronic health records ("EHRs"). Large hospitals and cancer
care centers contract with outside database vendors ("EHR vendors") to
store and manage access to patient EHRs. 17 7 At least some structured data
contained in a patient's EHR may also be reflected within a hospital's
billing records or in an insurer's customer records: "If the doctor bills for
their services, all that sort of information gets converted, if you will, into a
173. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Subject #42 (Sept. 19, 2014).
174. Id.
175. Telephone Interview with Richard L. Schilsky, M.D. (Aug. 26, 2014).
176. Id.
177. Id. This subject explained that EHRs often do not contain all records generated in
the course of treating patients: "[I]t's not all completely integrated into the electronic
medical records so a lot of it is returned to the doctor in the EHR but some of it is returned
to original reports that have to be scanned into the EHR and things of that sort." Id.
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lot of different kinds of codes that are used to submit the claim to
insurance," one subject explained. 178 The overall picture conveyed by
subjects is that patient treatment information is usually stored in multiple
places and overseen by different stewards, the most important of which are
EHR vendors and healthcare providers.
A former president of ASCO involved with the launch of CancerLinQ
explained that the business practices of EHR vendors pose a challenge to
data-pooling initiatives. "You need to have an EHR vendor or an institution
that is willing to share the data," he explained, and "[a] silo mentality is
associated with those vendors ... [T]hey are a notoriously proprietary
bunch that are not good at sharing-even within their own system[s]."'' 79
This problem is aggravated, the subject explained, by the fact that hospitals
have few choices when selecting EHR vendors to work with: "A fairly small
number of corporations are responsible for the electronic health records in
the United States," he said, adding, that these vendors do not store data in
common or widely accessible formats. 180 Other subjects made consistent
statements about the difficulty of obtaining data from EHR vendors. Some
explained that even when data is obtainable, it is not immediately usable. 181
Because EHR vendors store data in proprietary digital formats, some
subjects explained, a hospital seeking to share patient data with a data pool
must first translate all data it gathers into common, widely-readable digital
formats.' 82 This involves enlisting engineers with expertise in formatting
data to perform the translation.' 83
These findings are consistent with recent press accounts. In a September
2015 industry news report, a doctor who works at a medical practice
involved with CancerLinQ commented, "What has happened is that ERR
systems don't communicate with each other. Vanguard practices are having
to dedicate time and resources, including my entire IT department, to be
able to adapt the technology in order to implement CancerLinQ ... Other
EHR vendors are flat-out refusing or making it prohibitively expensive to
make the systems communicate with each other."' 184
178. Id.
179. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Subject #51 (Aug. 26, 2014).
180. Id.
181. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Subject #44 (Sept. 11, 2014).
182. Telephone Interview with Richard L. Schilsky, M.D. (Aug. 26,2014) (discussing
the fact that EHR vendors often store patient data in different formats).
183. Id.
184. See Frank Irving, ASCO Calls Out EHR Interoperability as Barrier to
CancerLinQ, XTELLIGENT MEDIA (Sept. 16, 2015), http://healthitinteroperability.com/
news/asco-calls-out-ehr-interoperability-as-barrier-to-cancerlinq (discussing
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Relatedly, a leading commentator and advocate for health data sharing
explained that many EHR vendors contractually forbid the hospitals they
serve from sharing data with outside institutions: "they [hospitals] are
wrapped up in contracts with their technology vendors-especially their
electronic health record vendors-where only the EHR vendors have rights
to go outside the hospital with data," he explained." 5 Independent research
into the practices of ERR vendors corroborates this statement, revealing that
many vendors indeed impose such contractual restrictions. 186 Other subjects
echoed this problem, but expressed optimism that such restrictions would
lessen over time as a result of certain provisions of the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act of 2010 that require EHR vendors to make patient
data more portable. 1
87
The difficulty of accessing data from large EHR vendors has led some
nascent data pools to approach smaller practices or academic institutions,
where treatment data may be relatively easier to gather. The president of a
private oncology practice group explained that CancerLinQ "looked at
private practices to start this project rather than academic institutions
[because] the data's probably more easily extractable from the private
practice EHRs and trying to get discrete information out of a big hospital
system can be very tedious."' 8 8 Other subjects consistently reported that
data held by smaller private practices is sometimes subject to fewer
technical and contractual barriers.
Apart from the barriers presented by EHRs, healthcare providers
seeking to contribute patient treatment data to a pool also must carefully
remove any information that might identify an individual patient. HIPAA,
mentioned earlier, forbids institutions from disclosing data that contains
names, zip codes, treatment dates, and other information that could identify
an individual patient. 189 Subjects explained that simply stripping these
identifiers from a dataset can remove useful information, however, such as
the length of time that a patient was treated, or the fact that the same patient
received treatments at different institutions. 9 ' To address this issue, some
CancerLinQ's potential and offering recommendations to help eliminate information
blocking as a barrier to interoperability).
185. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Subject #44 (Sept. 11, 2014).
186. Id.
187. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Subject #51 (Aug. 26, 2014).
188. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Subject #71 (Sept. 8, 2014).
189. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(e) (2013).
190. See, e.g., INFO. COMM'R'S OFFICE, ANONYMISATION: MANAGING DATA




health care institutions examined in this study hired engineers to "mask" or
obfuscate personally-identifying data with "dummy values" (random
numbers) in a manner that preserved underlying information.19' For
instance, engineers could consistently replace a patient's name with unique
random numbers so that the same patient or a group of patients could be
examined over time. 192 Likewise, a patient's treatment dates might be offset
by a consistent period of time-say, 7 weeks.193 This allows data scientists
to know how often a patient was seen and the total period of time the patient
was treated. A data scientist involved in this practice explained that these
examples are simplified: masking data to preserve privacy requires a
nuanced understanding of the content of the data, the ways in which it may
be used in the future, and the harm that could result from disclosure of
personally identifying patient information.194 Because the process requires
expert judgment, it cannot be automated.
Some subjects reported that manipulating data in this manner can be a
costly barrier to sharing data. "I think pretty much everyone in the
healthcare community [and the research community] views HIPAA laws as
a hindrance rather than a help to most patients," commented one subject.1 95
Complying with HIPAA imposes a cost, he explained, "basically because it
requires you to get an enormous amount of approval that adds immensely
to the expense of these things."' 196
Yet another fundamental upfront cost lies in locating critical data in
unstructured sets of information. According to a prominent academic
researcher with deep involvement in oncology data pooling, some of the
most important oncology data can only be identified by and recorded
manually and with great effort. This subject offered a fascinating illustration
of this problem by explaining the role that condolence cards play in relaying
mortality information:
It's not just a data-gathering problem. The problem is that, even if
you put data together in a soup, there can be huge holes of certain
information points that live in doctors' handwritten medical notes.
Take condolence cards, for example. As a country, we have the
social security death index, the national death index-all of these
ways of finding out whether someone has died. The social security
death index used to be a mandated activity and now it is not, so
191. See, e.g., Mattioli, supra note 13, at 566-68 (discussing data masking in depth).
192. Telephone Interview with Josh Mann, Assistant Director of Oncology
Technology Solutions at American Society of Clinical Oncology (Oct. 8, 2013).
193. Id.; see also Ohm, supra note 164, at 1703-05.
194. See supra note 163.
195. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Subject #51 (Aug. 26, 2014).
196. Id.
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it's a decaying data set, so it only reflects some proportion of
people-probably only seventy percent of deaths. But if you want
to do research, you need to know with certainty whether someone
is alive or not. So, I work with a dataset that is culled from
obituaries and funeral homes. That's the main way I get mortality
data. It turns out that even with this method, you still only find
about ninety percent of the mortality information you need. But if
you go into the medical record, and you read the case notes, you
see the note from the doctor that says, "I discussed hospice with
the family today." Now you know something is going on. You
find [a copy ofi the condolence card that says, "I am so sorry, Mrs.
Jones, to know about what happened to Fred." ... It actually
might be the condolence card that is the best symbol that this
patient has died. [Sometimes] we have no other place to figure out
that the patient has died. So one of the things that is becoming
apparent in the cancer data space is how important this
unstructured data morass is. It's there; as clinicians, we know it;
but it doesn't get captured in a useful way. [At a point in time
about five years ago], we believed that all we needed to do was
collect data and we could make sense of it later. That hasn't been
borne out. The promise of natural language processing as a
scalable solution to turn this kind of unstructured information into
meaningful data points is just not bearing out. In oncology, many
of the critical data points that you need for research live in places
that are completely unstructured. 197
Upfront costs also appear to hinder the pooling of useful data held by
pharmaceutical companies. A scientist involved with Project Data Sphere
hypothesized that in the course of his work, he might encounter "five
companies collecting information on prostate cancer patients and they are
all doing it in a little bit different manner ... there are little nuances that
may be different between my company, and another company, and an
academic organization. ' 98 An expert involved with this effort explained
that such differences create an upfront cost, because all data must be
translated into a common format. 199 The Chief Product Officer of Project
Data Sphere explained that it could take "a programmer and a statistician
... about 40 to 80 hours" to prepare just one data set for inclusion. z°
Although this amount of work is not tremendous, he explained, "if you...
scale that up ... it impacts resources. 2 0 1 He later commented that data
197. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Subject #42 (Sept. 9, 2016).
198. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Subject #29 (Aug. 26, 2014).
199. Id.




preparation is perhaps "the most significant obstacle" to forming effective
data pools in his view. 202
In summary, the cost of preparing cancer treatment and research data
poses a significant barrier to pooling it. These costs stem from hiring and
paying engineers and data experts to translate data into useful formats,
masking potentially personally-identifying information, searching for
useful data points within large sets of unstructured data, and related tasks
such as identifying and correcting errors in the data. Care providers may
face the additional challenge of obtaining the data from EHR vendors in the
first place.
D. UNCERTAIN RETURNS
Subjects interviewed for this study reported that a major challenge in
pooling cancer treatment and research data is convincing data holders that
their cooperation will yield direct benefits that outweigh the foregoing risks
and costs.
The "what's in it for me" question, as one subject termed it, appears to
be one of the central conundrums that data pools in the healthcare industry
appear to face.20 3 As the former Chief Product Officer of Project Data
Sphere explained,
I think there [are] two questions that you need to really work hard
to convince them [potential contributors of data]. 'What is the
value of sharing this data?'-that's one question. The other
question is, 'What is the valuefor me to share my data? 204
A prominent academic researcher consistently reported that the message
some data-pooling projects are communicating to data holders is, in effect,
"it's good for the world [if you] share your data [because] somebody else
can do something with it."'205 But this message, she explained, is less
persuasive than "saying you should share your data so that you can
collaborate ... and it's even another ... move to say 'share your data
because it's actually in the sharing that the unique intellectual property
comes,"' she continued. 20 6 "Those degrees of separation-each one requires
a step outside the box." 207 A subject involved with Project Data Sphere
commented, "I think the biggest problem ... is getting more data and
202. Id.
203. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Subject #29 (Aug. 26, 2014).
204. Telephone Interview with Kald Abdullah (Aug. 27, 2014).
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convincing people that it is valuable ... Why am I going to put resources
behind this when I am not sure what I am going to get out of it?"
20 8
A potential solution that some data-pooling groups are experimenting
with is to promise to share useful statistical information with participating
data holders. CancerLinQ, for example, plans to report to member hospitals
summaries of how their quality of service measures up to that of other
members and to national standards. 20 9 The Chief Medical Officer of ASCO
explained,
We will be able to return to the physician on a regular basis a
dashboard report that shows what is the quality of their
performance against ... standard measures .... Eventually we
will be able to show them how the outcomes of their patients
compared to the outcomes of other similar patients in other similar
practices. . . We think that will be a big incentive to them tojoin.210
According to an executive involved with the project, Project Data Sphere is
considering offering a similar incentive, in the form of sharing "use cases"
that would allow researchers to better design and evaluate their clinical
trials.21 1
Some data holders interviewed were optimistic about this approach. "I
mean, any quality metrics that you get back to your practice are always
helpful to keep you ahead of the curve and to make you practice better,"
commented the president of a private oncology practice group. 212 Moreover,
there may be financial incentives for health care institutions to know how
well they measure up to their competitors. Health providers "can use that
information to report to insurers what their quality is, how it compares to
other physicians," explained the CIO of ASCO. 2 13 Several subjects
explained that the Affordable Care Act's measures for "accountable care,"
under which participating healthcare providers are reimbursed based upon
the relative quality of care they provide, could make the sort of metrics
208. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Subject #29 (Aug. 26, 2014).
209. Id.
210. Telephone Interview with Richard L. Schilsky, M.D. (Aug. 26, 2014).
211. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Subject #29 (Aug. 26, 2014) ("We are
working on several very interesting projects to publish use cases that can evaluate the
validity of clinical-trial data or perhaps predict the potential outcome of phase-three data
based on phase-one and phase-two responses.").
212. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Subject #71 (Sept. 8, 2014).
213. Telephone Interview with Richard L. Schilsky, M.D. (Aug. 26, 2014).
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CancerLinQ plans to share an effective enticement.214 In other words,
healthcare providers that operate under the accountable care model should
wish for more information describing how their quality of service compares
to that of their competitors. It is not yet clear whether this incentive will
lead to greater data pooling, and in turn, advances in cancer treatment.
Another source of uncertainty stems from a lack of clarity over how
profits or valuable patent rights generated by a data pool would be divided
among those who contribute to it. "Suppose a new analytical method took a
long time to develop," one respondent hypothesized, "and it's significantly
predictive and different than what you can buy in the commercial space...
. Someone is going to want to get paid for that because it took a long time
to build .... You're going to want to get something back out of that., 215 At
the time of this writing, none of the data pools examined have a system in
place for dividing such royalties among data contributors. 216
Lastly, some subjects explained that cultural forces that oppose data
disclosure make the potential benefits of pooling all the less certain. Calling
back to a theme discussed earlier in this Article, one subject reported that
within medical research, cumulative innovation is valued more highly than
recombinant innovation: "Science is incredibly reductionist and 'looking
down' as opposed to 'looking out and across.' That's one of the big
differences. And we celebrate the science that looks down, and we call the
science that's collaborative dumb. That's part of the problem." 217 Large
hospitals and research centers may similarly fail to see the benefit of data
pooling. The CEO of a nonprofit data-sharing group commented:
We have approached many, many medical institutions, large
cancer centers, especially the big ones ... They are very, very
protective of their data. Because they think they are big enough to
be able to not need anyone else's data, so they won't share their
data... It is strongly in the culture. 218
214. See generally Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18001
(2010); see also OLIVER WYMAN, TRACKJNG THE GROWTH OF ACCOUNTABLE CARE (Sept.
2013), http://www.oliverwyman.com/content/dam/oliver-wyman/global/en/files/archive
/2013/OWHLS_ACO-maps.pdf (providing a helpful summary and map displaying these
accountable care organizations).
215. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Subject #17, member, Data Alliance
Collaborative (Sept. 10, 2014).
216. For examples of how patent pools divide royalties, see Mattioli, supra note 13.
217. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Subject #42 (Sept. 19, 2014).
218. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Subject #57 (Aug. 29, 2014).
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IV. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The foregoing study reveals several factors discouraging the pooling of
cancer treatment and research data. Some of these factors, such as concerns
about professional, competitive, and reputational standing, are not widely
predicted by theory. This Part explores the policy implications of these
findings, and suggests possible avenues for future policy work.
A. IMPLICATIONS FOR INNOVATION POLICY
Should policymakers be concerned by the challenges that private data
pools face? To answer this question, it is helpful to first consider the specific
problems this study uncovers, and how far they might reach. Why might we
think that this study reflects a problem that reaches beyond a few institutions
in a single industry?
1. Summarizing the Problem
The problem uncovered by this study can be stated simply: the pooling
of cancer treatment and research data-widely thought to be a necessary
precondition for certain innovations in cancer care-appears to be hindered
by collective action problems playing out between data holders and nascent
pools. Some of the most important impediments are not neatly reducible to
simple "free-rider" dilemmas predicted by legal scholars and economists.
To consider the possible reach of the data-pooling problem, it is helpful
to examine its causes. This problem is spurred in part by data holders'
concerns regarding professional, competitive, and reputational standing.
Some healthcare providers appear to be reluctant to disclose treatment data
to a pool because they fear that doing so will lead to negative publicity and
a reduced inflow of patients in the future. Sharing data with a pool could
reveal a hospital's relatively poor record of patient outcomes, for example.
Similar concerns appear to discourage the pooling of some kinds of clinical
trial data held by pharmaceutical companies. A drug firm might hesitate to
exchange certain data too widely for fear that a competitor could benefit
from information revealed by that data. Academic researchers appear to face
similar disincentives. In a profession where research data can pave the way
to publications, tenure, and grants, researchers at universities may have little
motivation to share the data they collect. To the contrary, according to
subjects interviewed, academic scientists tend to guard their data
jealously.2 19 Although some grant-funding agencies such as the NIH
require data to be disclosed, subjects interviewed for this study explained
219. See supra Section II.B.
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that such requirements are often subverted through strategic "data
dumping." 220 (These observations square with recent empirical work on
secrecy among clinical biomedical researchers.) 221 Finally, individual
patients may believe that sharing their health data too widely could change
how insurers, employers, and others view them, possibly opening the door
to discriminatory treatment.222
Alongside such concerns are the costs of preparing data. For both legal
and practical reasons, data holders often must manipulate their data before
disclosing it. As several subjects explained, HIPAA creates a risk of liability
for health care providers that share patient treatment information. 223 Care
providers who wish to minimize that risk without rendering their data
useless to research efforts must manipulate it in various ways prior to
disclosure (e.g., "masking" personally identifying information, etc.). This
may involve hiring highly skilled (and, consequently, highly paid)
engineers.224 Evidence from this study indicates that such costs can
discourage pooling.225
Electronic health record vendors appear to represent a related, but
distinct problem. These companies sometimes intentionally make data
access and reuse difficult as a deliberate business strategy-i.e., as an
attempt to "lock in" clients. Some may do so by storing data in proprietary
formats and by placing contractual restrictions on how their clients (i.e.,
care providers) may use the data they store. Interview subjects indicated that
even when care providers are able to obtain data from electronic health
record vendors, they must incur costs translating it into a standard, widely
readable format before submitting it to pools.
Data held by pharmaceutical companies also must be prepared prior to
sharing-although for slightly different reasons. Unlike healthcare
providers, which hire outside vendors to store patient treatment data, private
pharmaceutical companies can easily access the data they generate in the
course of clinical trials because they store it themselves. This study
220. Id.
221. Wei Hong & John P. Walsh, For Money or Glory?. Commercialization,
Competition, and Secrecy in the Entrepreneurial University, 50 SOC. Q. 145 (2009).
222. There are some notable counter-examples, however, including a cancer survivor
who received high-profile press coverage for disseminating his treatment data widely. But
see, Steve Lohr, The Healing Power of Your Own Medical Records, N.Y. TiMES (March.
31, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/01/technology/the-healing-power-of-your-
own-medical-data.html.
223. See supra Section II.B.; Section III.A.
224. See supra Section II.B.; Section III.A.
225. See, e.g., supra notes 170-77 and accompanying text. This discussion lays out the
character of such costs and includes comments from an interviewee (note 177) who
explained their significance.
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indicates, however, that different pharmaceutical firms record and store
their data differently. As a result, any effort to pool cancer treatment data
must include a plan for translating it all into a common format.
2. Assessing the Problem s Possible Reach
If policymakers are to develop solutions to the foregoing problem, they
must have a clear sense of the problem's possible reach. As explained
earlier, the purpose of this study was not to conclusively prove or disprove
the existence of a widespread data-pooling problem. Rather, this study's
more modest goal was to investigate whether such a problem, as suggested
by theory, is affecting an important field of research. It would be imprudent
to assume that the factors that discourage the pooling of cancer treatment
and research data will similarly discourage all Big Data efforts.22 6 How far,
then, might the problem reach? A rigorous empirical answer to that question
would require similar studies of other settings where data pooling is being
attempted. This Article hopes to motivate other scholars to conduct such
studies. But until that work is done, it is possible to draw some informed
deductions from this study.
At the very least, the problems uncovered by this study appear to present
a problem for Big Data efforts in the field of cancer research. This
conclusion is based on the observation that the concerns and costs
uncovered by this study do not appear to be unique to the specific
institutions examined. In accordance with the LAD research framework,
interview subjects were deliberately asked to comment on the broader
environment in which the pools examined operate. The sources of the
problem clearly appear to be more general, and rooted in the perceptions of
individuals and dynamics of culture: concerns about patient privacy, the
competitive need to draw customers and patrons, reputational interests, the
unstandardized formats in which data of some kinds is often stored. Based
upon this observation alone, it seems reasonable to expect other private
efforts to pool cancer treatment data to be susceptible to similar challenges.
The concerns and costs uncovered by this study also do not appear to be
unique to cancer data. Stated differently, subjects interviewed did not
suggest that there is anything unique about the content of cancer treatment
data, or the processes by which such data is recorded and stored that makes
pooling it difficult. Rather, the problem stems from the types of institutions
involved, the environment in which they operate, intrinsic qualities of
health-related data, and bodies of law that apply to such data.
226. As explained earlier, the decision to focus this study on cancer treatment data was
motivated purely by the fact that, at the time of this writing, cancer treatment is a focus of
activity and investment among proponents of Big Data.
THE DATA-POOLING PROBLEM
It seems reasonable, then, to expect that attempts to pool data related to
the treatment of other health conditions to be affected by the same concern.
Such hypothetical data pools-if they were to form in the future-might
include new kinds of data holders, of course. In addition to hospitals,
pharmaceutical companies, academic researchers, and individuals, the
manufacturers of smartphones and other personal medical devices hold a
wealth of useful health-related data. These new companies could introduce
new dynamics, new concerns, and new possibilities, of course. But there is
no reason to expect they would not be subject to some of the same barriers
to data pooling encountered by the firms and institutions studied here.
Could similar problems hinder data-pooling in other industries
altogether? Possibly. As explained earlier, an important and somewhat
surprising fact uncovered by this study is that cancer treatment data holders
are concerned about professional, competitive, and reputational standing.
These concerns are motivated by a common idea-namely, that a data
holder's data could, at some future time, reflect something unfavorable
about them or harmful to them.227 This anxiety seems particularly timely. A
hallmark of Big Data is its power to reveal surprising insights from data
generated for no particular purpose. In an age where, as Paul Ohm recently
suggested, "everything might reveal everything," it would be unsurprising
to learn that data holders of many kinds worry about what their data might
reveal about them.221 This could have important outcomes in developing
industries where data pooling could be helpful, but could also reflect poorly
on data holders-telemetry and collision data from autonomous vehicles,
for instance.
To sum up, the problems uncovered by this study are likely to impact
not only cancer data-pooling efforts, but also related efforts to pool health
data of other kinds. Moreover, there is at least a basis to expect similar
general problems to develop in other industries and research settings where
Big Data might soon be embraced.
3. Considering the Problem's Policy Implications
The introduction to this Article explained why data pooling could, in
theory, present a problem for policymakers. That explanation focused on
two innovation policy goals: first, the federal government's targeted
227. See supra Section II.B. As explained earlier, legal scholars such as James Anton
and Dennis Yao have highlighted the role that competitive concerns can play in
discouraging information exchanges in the context of standard setting. Id.; see also infra
note 231 and accompanying text (referring to concems over anticompetitive information
sharing served as an animating force behind federal legislation).
228. Ohm & Peppet, supra note 71.
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funding of Big Data research projects; second, the government's broad goal
of encouraging innovation through the patent system.
It is clear why the problem uncovered by this study is relevant to the
government's investments in Big Data research. As mentioned earlier,
federal agencies have committed over $200 million to help develop new
methods of gleaning insights from enormous volumes of data. If the private
entities that hold some types of data-at least cancer treatment and research
data-are unable or unwilling to assemble such volumes of data in the first
place, then the full potential of the government's investments in Big Data
might go unrealized.
The problem uncovered by this study also appears to have a bearing on
federal innovation policy as expressed through intellectual property law.
The reasoning behind this conclusion is straightforward: a central purpose
of the patent system is to encourage technological progress. Big Data
algorithms can enable technological progress of many kinds, and they are
also a category of subject matter theoretically eligible for patent protection
(even in light of doubts cast by Alice and its progeny). If a precondition for
the development of such inventions is unmet, then policymakers could view
the result as a subversion of the patent system's goals. The foregone
innovations could also be described in economic terms, as representing a
drop in dynamic efficiency.
Policymakers may wish to correct this problem by seeking to actively
encourage data pooling. The U.S. government has a history of encouraging
the exchange of technological information for the purpose of fostering
innovation. Patent pools have often formed as a result of governmental
intervention. 229 On the other hand, the patent pools that the government has
encouraged served to untangle knots that the government had arguably
created in the first place-i.e., by apportioning patent rights that developed
into thickets. By contrast, the data held by private institutions like those
examined here is not a form of property created by the government, nor does
it enjoy robust intellectual property protections. Opponents of policy
intervention might argue, then, that data pooling is not the government's
problem to solve because the government played no direct role in creating
it.
229. Moreover, patent pools that have formed without state intervention have
overwhelmingly been geared toward decreasing the cost of producing existing technologies
rather than fostering the development of new ones. David W. Van Etten, Everyone in the
Patent Pool: U.S. Phillips Corp. v. International Trade Commission, 22 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 241, 254 (2007) (describing express motivations of various actors who formed patent
pools without state intervention).
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There are other examples of the government stepping in to encourage
the sharing of technological information, however. Standard-setting-a
process that necessarily involves technological information-sharing-has
been encouraged by the government in various ways. 230 The National
Cooperative Research and Production Act (NCRPA) is a federal law passed
in 1984 that reduces antitrust liability for certain research consortia that
make their activities known to the Department of Justice and the Federal
Trade Commission. 231 The law is "designed to promote innovation,
facilitate trade, and strengthen the competitiveness of the United States in
world markets." 232 These examples suggest that a proposal designed to
encourage the pooling of data could succeed in being passed into law.
B. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The recommendations and suggestions presented in the paragraphs that
follow help to show the value of ethnographic studies like the one presented
in Part III of this Article. By understanding how a collective action problem
affects an important area of research, policymakers and scholars alike can
develop informed solutions.
It is helpful to first touch upon an avenue of policymaking that could
present special challenges: exclusive rights. One might conclude that data
pooling could be encouraged through new laws that imbue scientific and
industrial data with intellectual property-like protections-so-called sui
generis data protection. This idea is a perennial subject of policy debate and
it has an intuitive appeal. Like copyrightable and patentable subject matter,
useful scientific and industrial information is costly to create, easy to copy,
and subject to free-rider problems. With the power to exclude any and all
unwanted users, data holders might be more willing to enter into exchanges.
Some leading commentators have argued persuasively that sui generis
intellectual property protection for data might actually reduce the level of
230. See generally supra Part III.
231. Antitrust law's potential chilling effects on information sharing led policymakers
in 1984 to pass The National Cooperative Research and Production Act ("NCRPA"). See
James J. Anton & Dennis A. Yao, Standard-Setting Consortia, Antitrust, and High-
Technology Industries, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 247, 247-49 (1995); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE &
F.T.C., Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors, reprinted in 4 Trade
Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,161, at 1 (2000), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
publicevents/joint-venture-hearings-antitrust-guidelines-collaboration-among-
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innovation in society, however. 233 Pamela Samuelson and J.H. Reichman,
most notably, explained that such laws could give database holders the
power to control access to basic scientific research materials. 234 This, they
argued, would dampen research and "undermine the competitive ethos on
which market economies depend., 235 Current law is consistent with this
view. Although Congress has regularly considered data-protection bills
since the 1990s, none gained sufficient political goodwill to be enacted into
law. But more specifically, this study does not suggest that a lack of
property protections is the central reason that data is not being widely
shared. There may simply be new and more effective ways of encouraging
data pooling.236
A second threshold consideration relates to public versus private data.
Although this Article is focused primarily on data held in the private sector,
it is important to note that a wealth of health data in is funded by government
institutions such as the NIH. Arti Rai and Rebecca Eisenberg have explored
how such public actors can helpfully influence the pooling of-for
instance-federally-funded biomedical data.237 More recently, Rai has
explored the role of risk regulators in the data-pooling context, as well as
how some private sector data pooling has been encouraged by threats of
regulatory action-her observations, insights, and recommendations are
deeply relevant to the problems examined in this Article.
238
It is also helpful to note that national governments have sometimes
worked directly with private companies to create vast databases related to
health information. As Peter Lee has documented, one of the most
widespread was a joint effort between the Icelandic government and a
private company in the 1990s to build a database of "clinical records, DNA,
233. For a valuable related exploration of the merits of property rules versus liability
rules with respect to information, see Mark A. Lemley & Phil Weiser, Should Property or
Liability Rules Govern Information?, 85 TEX. L. REV. 783 (2007).
234. See, e.g., Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 119, at 95-113.
235. Id.
236. In earlier work, I explored the idea of offering limited exclusivity in data as a
means to encourage the disclosure of methods by which data was collected and prepared-
i.e., metadata-but that approach addressed a problem that occurs in settings where the use
of the data is unknown by the entity collecting and sharing it. The data holders examined
in this study, by contrast, are aware of the types of research uses the data pools examined
have. As a result, the solution seems unhelpful.
237. Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of
Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289 (2003).
238. Rai, supra note 100.
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and family histories for the entire country., 239 As Lee explains, this plan
was controversial. 240 Because there seems to be a desire within the oncology
treatment community to form data pools, it might be most desirable for the
government to encourage cooperation through nudges, rather than
managing a data pool directly or through such a partnership. More direct
involvement may be helpful in other industrial settings, however.
A more hopeful focus of future policy efforts could relate to standards.
As discussed earlier, a major obstacle to pooling health data is the cost of
conforming patient treatment records into common formats. The federal
government could reduce these costs by encouraging the standardization of
electronic health records. The best approach is probably not a direct
mandate that all healthcare providers and electronic health record vendors
adopt a specific set of standards. The federal government mandates
standards in only limited settings-the side of the road that we drive on, or
permissible uses of radio spectrum frequencies licensed to private users, for
instance.24 ' As a general policy matter, the government disfavors mandating
the adoption of specific technology standards and even specific
interoperability requirements, and prefers to instead promulgate standards
of performance.242 As a recent publication of the Federal Trade
Commission explains, "U.S. Government agencies, such as, for example,
the Consumer Product Safety Commission, the Food and Drug
Administration, and the Environmental Protection Agency, may set safety,
health, and environmental requirements designed to protect the public, but
they rely upon voluntary consensus standards, where possible, to meet their
regulatory objectives." 243 In short, a gentle approach of encouraging
standardization of health data could be more likely to succeed.
One such approach would be for the federal government to lead by
example. Federal healthcare institutions could, for instance, adopt certain
standards for storing patient treatment records. This approach has been
239. Peter Lee, Toward a Distributive Commons in Patent Law, 2009 Wis. L. REV.
917, 990 (2009).
240. Id.
241. Joseph Farrell & Paul Klemperer, Coordination and Lock-in: Competition with
Switching Costs and Network Effects, in 3 HANDBOOK OF INDUS. ORG. 2007, 2010 (M.
Armstrong & R. Porter eds., 2007).
242. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, COMPETITIVE ASPECTS OF COLLABORATIVE
STANDARD SErTING, at 5 § 2.2(7) (June 9, 2010), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/
attachments/us-submissions-oecd-and-other-international-competition-fora/
usstandardsetting.pdf ("Most government standard setting activities ... focus on
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advocated by the Bipartisan Policy Center, a nonprofit policy think tank in
Washington. In July 2015, the organization released a report recommending
that Congress "require the federal government to adopt standards for health
IT.",244 Measures outlined in the report include the federal government's
adoption of standards designed to permit patients to be tracked over time
and the adoption of common standards by private EHR vendors on contract
with the government.245 This idea could be an effective "nudge" to
encourage standardization of private patient treatment records. If all EHR
vendors that wish to work with the government must adopt standard ways
of organizing patient treatment data, it might be easiest for these same
vendors to store private hospital data in the same formats.
The government could offer incentives to institutions that conform to
certain data standards. This recommendation was inspired by an expert
interviewed for this study, who commented, "I think it may not be that we
want the government to set the standards, because sometimes ... they don't
necessarily get it right ... it may be that we want them to provide the
incentives for the standards to be set.",24 6 One such incentive could be
insurance reimbursements offered to health care providers. As explained
earlier, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act offers monetary
rewards to certain healthcare providers that demonstrate a record of high
quality care. To reap these rewards, healthcare providers must share patient
treatment data with outside institutions, including insurance providers. This
law could be amended to offer an enhanced reward in the form of higher
reimbursements to healthcare providers that share their data in specific,
standard formats. In a related article, Rebecca Eisenberg and Nicholson
Price explored how insurance companies, which hold claims data could play
a role in developing important knowledge about the quality and efficacy of
healthcare products-a concept they call "demand-side innovation. '"247
244. BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., ADVANCING MEDICAL INNOVATION FOR A HEALTHIER
AMERICA (July 2015), http://bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/BPC-
Advaning-Medical-lnnovation.pdf.
245. Id. at 12 (describing such innovations in Proposal 1.7). A related effort is the Blue
Button Initiative, led by the Department of Health and Human Services, which aims to
enable patients to securely access personal health data online. See What is the Blue Button?,
HEALTHIT.GOV (Jan. 15, 2013), https://www.healthit.gov/patients-families/faqs/what-
blue-button. Although this program does not explore challenges posed by the lack of
standards for data generated by consumer medical devices, the suggestions made here
could nevertheless apply to data generated by such devices.
246. Telephone Interview with Richard L. Schilsky, M.D. (Aug. 26, 2014).
247. Rebecca Eisenberg & W. Nicholson Price, Promoting Healthcare Innovation on




Turning toward industry, this study revealed that data sharing between
companies is frustrated by a variety of competitive concerns. 248 In this
setting, it may be advisable for the government to take a more hands-on
approach by directly mandating data sharing between companies. The FDA,
for instance, could require drug manufacturers to make more clinical drug
trial data (e.g., data describing safety or effectiveness of drugs) available to
certain data-pooling efforts. Similarly, the FDA could require medical
device manufacturers and software developers to adopt standards and data-
sharing practices as a condition of having their products and services
approved. This approach could be viewed as onerous, however.
Pharmaceutical companies and manufacturers of devices that collect health
data would likely oppose the idea because it places a new burden upon them.
Some critics may argue, for instance, that a measure designed to promote
innovation should not impose a new set of costs upon innovative companies.
A gentler approach would provide targeted rewards to companies that
agree to pool data. There is precedent for this idea. Beginning in 2007, the
FDA began offering "Priority Review Vouchers" ("PRV") to drug
companies that sought FDA approval for products designed to target
tropical diseases. 249 The vouchers, which substantially reduced the time
necessary to bring a drug to market, were valued so highly by some
corporations that they inspired the formation of at least one patent pool.250
The FDA could offer a similar expedited review and approval process to
companies that submit useful health data (e.g., clinical trial information,
data generated by consumer health devices, etc.) to the public or to certain
data-pooling consortia. Like PRVs, vouchers for this expedited review
process could be transferrable, which would likely enhance their value.251
In a similar vein, the NIH and other federal agencies that provide
research grants could impose stricter data-sharing requirements on grant
recipients, and importantly, greater penalties for failure to adhere to such
policies. The practice of "data-dumping," which one interview subject
248. See generally supra Part III.
249. See Michael Mattioli, Communities of Innovation, 106 Nw. U. L. REv. 103, 126-
27 (2015) (discussing the FDA's provision of such vouchers).
250. Id.
251. A similar possibility not directly inspired by this study would be for the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) to offer a similar fast-track to patent
applicants who claim new innovations derived from data pools. This enticement could act
as a general incentive. In 2009, the USPTO offered an expedited review process to patent
applicants who claimed inventions that would benefit the environment. Pilot Program for
Green Technologies Including Greenhouse Gas Reduction, 74 Fed. Reg. 64666 (Dec. 8,
2009).
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reported is common, would likely be a helpful area for reform as well. Just
as patent applicants are not permitted to hide potentially important
information from the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), federal grant
recipients might be forbidden from obfuscating useful data from the public.
Yet another policy intervention could focus on reducing the risk of
liability that data holders face for inadvertent disclosure of personally
identifying information. The severity of civil and criminal penalties under
HIPAA and related bodies of federal and state law designed to protect
personal privacy could be reduced, for instance, for organizations that can
demonstrate that they disclosed data to a data pool that has identified itself
to relevant federal authorities.2 5 2 Such a measure would entail creating a
new procedure by which cooperative data pools could notify the FTC (or
another federal agency selected) of their cooperative efforts. These
measures could include standards to determine if contributed data has been
sufficiently de-identified. In exchange, their potential liability for privacy
violations under HIPAA and other relevant law could be capped at a
percentage of what it would ordinarily be.
This remedy is directly inspired by the National Cooperative Research
and Production Act (NCRPA)-a federal law passed in 1984 that reduces
antitrust liability for certain research consortia that make their activities
known to the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission.2 5
3
Because antitrust liability concerns did not appear to play an important role
in discouraging data sharing among the institutions examined here, antitrust
is not the subject of any specific recommendation. However, such an
approach could be useful in other industry settings. Antitrust authorities
have recognized that certain types of information-sharing arrangements
between firms can have anticompetitive effects that violate the Sherman and
Clayton Acts, however.254 James Anton and Dennis Yao have posited that
risks associated with antitrust liability "may interfere with transmission of
information that could improve the joint decision to create a standard., 255
252. Penalties under HIPAA include fines that can reach as high as $250,000 and up
to 10 years in prison. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d(6) (2010).
253. See supra note 231.
254. Teece, supra note 61, at 474 ("[M]eetings and exchanges of technical information
•. can cause antitrust suspicion."); see also Tor & Aviram, supra note 101, at 236 ("Due
to the potential anti-competitive effect of information sharing, antitrust law frequently
analyzes the likelihood that information sharing will facilitate collusion."); HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE
171-72 (1994) (discussing the types of information exchanges that may facilitate
collusion).
255. Anton & Yao, supra note 231, at 264. For instance, an agreement among a group
of companies to share pricing information in order to collusively charge consumers
supracompetitive rates would be illegal. Id.
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Tax incentives are another possibility. The IRS could enact a new rule
offering charitable tax deductions to individuals who donate their health
treatment data to certain qualifying data-pooling efforts, for instance. More
nuanced measures could also be possible. Medicare reimbursements could,
in the future, be enhanced for patients who agree to share their data more
widely. Along the same lines, individuals who donate their data to certain
pooling efforts could receive-from private insurers or through Medicaid-
reimbursements for medical tests and procedures they would not otherwise
be covered for.
Considering the variety of actors that hold data useful to oncology
research and the variety of impediments that may discourage each actor
from sharing its data, it is helpful to consider how the foregoing suggestions
might pair with the various stakeholders discussed earlier in this Article.
Table 1 summarizes these relationships visually by comparing various
solutions that emerged during the interview process to the various
stakeholders discussed earlier in this Article. 256 Cells of the table that
contain an "X" indicate a solution primarily designed to address an
impediment to data pooling that were consistently reported by a particular
actor. This summary shows that (at least among the proposals suggested
here), there is no "one-size-fits-all" solution.
256. I wish to credit and express my thanks to Pamela Samuelson for suggesting the
use of a table to summarize these connections.
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Table 1: Primary Links Between Policy Suggestions and Stakeholders
Healthcare Corporations Academic






















Tax Incentives X X X
Each of the foregoing suggestions would present practical challenges,
but some of these challenges may be surmountable. An overarching
problem would be selective nondisclosure-i.e., the sharing of incorrect or
incomplete data. This problem is, in a sense, a cousin of "data dumping," as
described by the interview subject from academia. Any policy designed to
mandate or encourage the sharing of data could be subject to this form of
gaming. In light of this possibility, all such proposals would necessitate
some level of monitoring and perhaps penalties for selective
nondisclosure-two steps that would introduce complexity and cost. While
these challenges should not be downplayed, they are curable. The FDA
could levy sanctions, for example, on pharmaceutical corporations that
attempt to circumvent a new set of data-sharing requirements. Academic
researchers who engage in similar behavior could be denied future grants.
In short, this problem is probably solvable.
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Some of these measures could also spur litigation. Because data pools
would likely need to be bound together by contracts, one would expect to
see an increase in contract disputes as the number and size of data pools
increase. One would also expect that data pools, if they form in large enough
numbers, could raise competition concerns-through tying arrangements,
or through pooling substitutive data, for instance. The number of civil
disputes and prosecutions under antitrust laws could conceivably increase
in the future. 25 7 This too would represent new costs.2 5 8
In the area of cancer treatment, it is easy to imagine that the costs of
encouraging greater data pooling might well be dwarfed by the social and
economic benefits of success. In other industries, the potential gains might
be less clear. Through discussion and debate over proposals like those
outlined here, policymakers, industry stakeholders, and the public can make
informed decisions tailored to specific settings.
V. CONCLUSION
The pooling of data appears to be an increasingly important and unmet
precondition for innovation in many settings, and yet it may not occur
without government intervention. To gain an empirical view of this
problem, this Article presented an ethnographic study of institutions seeking
to pool cancer treatment and research data. This study revealed that a variety
of costs, risks, and competitive concerns are impeding the useful pooling of
data. Some of these findings are not widely predicted by theory: hospitals
do not wish to disclose data that reflects poorly on the quality of service
they provide, and separately, they voice concerns over potential liability for
privacy violations; pharmaceutical companies closely guard data that could
reveal their business strategies to competitors; academic researchers have
every incentive to hold tight to data that could fuel publications and
professional advancement.
Informed by these insights and the important earlier work of other
scholars that this study was based upon, this Article proposed a set of policy
suggestions. First, lawmakers could encourage the adoption of health data-
pooling by requiring federal healthcare institutions and the vendors they
contract with to adhere to uniform standards for storing data; second,
lawmakers could encourage even greater adoption of health data standards
by offering targeted incentives similar to those offered to "Accountable
257. See D. Daniel Sokol & Roisin Comerford, Does Antitrust Have a Role to Play in
Regulating Big Data?, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY & HIGH TECH 271 (Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol eds., 2017).
258. Even if data pools could avail themselves of the NCRPA, this would only result
in reduced penalties.
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Care" institutions under the Affordable Care Act; third, the FDA could offer
a new expedited review process to pharmaceutical companies that
cooperatively pool clinical trial data; fourth, lawmakers could modify
HIPAA and other bodies of law designed to preserve patient privacy to
encourage the responsible pooling of anonymous treatment data; fifth,
income tax incentives could be offered to encourage individual patients to
donate their health records to data pools. These suggestions are offered as
tailored approaches designed to increase the volume and rate of patient
treatment data pooling.
Researchers have glimpsed the future within data pools. It is written in
the language of statistics-a language of patterns, signals, and unexpected
correlations. Because this new science can spur innovation, the federal
government has sought to encourage its development. Missing, however, is
a plan for bringing highly dispersed data together, a necessary precondition.
This Article has provided theoretical and empirical support for the view that
data pools are unlikely to independently form and thrive. A single policy
solution seems unlikely to address the many factors that discourage useful
cooperation. Policymakers should now seek to understand the collective
action problems that stand in the way. From this knowledge, they can
assemble new constellations of policies designed to ensure that the
cooperative preconditions for innovation are met.
